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I. INTRODUCTION
A. Preface
This article recounts the course and resolution of litigation in Newport,
Oregon, from 1999 to 2002 that challenged the proposed merger of a
Roman Catholic health system and a governmental, local hospital district.2
Although the merger may simply be seen as one more instance of the
pattern of mergers in the health care3 industry during the past decade,4 the
issues raised in the Newport case are of considerable significance for
several reasons.
First, the underlying agreement between a governmental hospital district,
Pacific Communities Health District (the Health District), and a religious
entity, the Providence Health System (Providence),5 raised constitutional
questions as to whether and how a religiously affiliated health care system
could merge with a public hospital district, exercising the latter’s
governmental prerogatives of taxation and governance.6 The issue was
unavoidable because the terms of the agreement between the two hospitals
committed the parties to respect Providence’s “mission and values,” a
phrase that included the Ethical and Religious Directives on Health Care of
the American Catholic Bishops Association (the Directives).7 The Newport
case also raised serious questions as to the economic and service
responsibilities of a public body, since the Health District would be
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transferring twenty-five million dollars in assets and annual revenues
without corresponding consideration.
Second, the exact nature of the religious issue in the case became difficult
to identify. It might have been the simple fact of including religion in the
agreement in post-merger services, or it might have been the nature of the
corporation receiving the benefits from the agreement. That corporation,
Providence, as a religious entity was a matter of dispute. Providence’s
buildings, services, and personnel are much like those of any large,
effective health care system, sectarian or nonsectarian. However, its bylaws
and corporate mission are different, as noted above, because they are
subject to the Directives, although the significance of these to a patient is
hardly self-evident. In addition, the impact on staff is equally unclear.8
Thus, much of the proof and advocacy related to how religion assumed
importance in the case.
Third, the procedural aspects of the litigation, as well as its outcome,
have considerable significance for similar litigation and mergers elsewhere.
Although the Newport litigation might have been expected to reach a
resolution on its pleadings or by summary judgment, it went through full
discovery and a two-week trial. Thus, the Newport case provides one
scenario for how such a trial might proceed.9
A few surprising aspects of the Newport litigation should be noted at the
outset. There were extensive factual disputes concerning the effect of a
merger with a religious hospital on services provided, the religious nature of
the parties, and the fiscal need or wisdom of the agreement. Also, the
arrangement in Newport, which entailed transferring assets and operations
to a religious entity while keeping the governmental shell intact, meant that
the agreement could be understood as tending to establish religion, either by
preferential treatment of religion or by putting religion in charge of
government, a distinction that made a difference in which case law was
relied upon.10 Alternatively, the agreement could be seen as preferring one
religion over others, thereby chilling the free exercise of religion and that,
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again, would invoke a separate body of case law.11 Another surprising
aspect was that while the religious mission of Providence (“the healing
ministry of Jesus”12) permeated the entire corporate entity and was openly
espoused in its literature, there was testimony that Providence did not
enforce the Directives.13
Finally, a continuing and obvious, but
unappreciated, difficulty was proving a future status or consequence, i.e.,
that the merger agreement would ultimately lead to establishing religion or
denying procreative rights. The difficulty here was that no witness could
testify as to future consequences, yet these possibilities were central to the
litigation.14
While these features of the case were noteworthy, the central task of all
public interest litigation is to convert abstract constitutional principles into
detailed proof, through live witnesses in an actual courtroom, talking about
abstractions such as “entanglement,” “effect,” and “corporate culture” as
though they were palpable facts. Such substance must turn on procedure:
qualifying expert witnesses on public health, reproductive health services,
and Church practices; offering photographs of hospital walls with crucifixes
and hospital brochures with religious references; or presenting testimony
concerning the impact of the Ethical and Religious Directives on the course
of negotiations. In these ways, the abstractions of constitutional or public
interest litigation take corporeal form to walk and speak in a specific
courtroom in a given case.
The “separate but equal” doctrine in Brown v. Board of Education,15 the
importance of counsel in Miranda v. Arizona,16 or the risk of advising
husbands of intended abortions in Planned Parenthood v. Casey,17 are all
matters of abstract constitutional theory. But they are also the stuff of
human existence. Their presence in a case and their importance in the lives
of litigants must be proven in a human, tangible way. Thus, this article will
explore in some detail the way in which witness testimony unfolded in the
Newport case because that process is essential to legal theory, and because
the problems and resolutions are likely to recur elsewhere.
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B. An Overview of the Facts18
Providence is a Roman Catholic enterprise and a major provider of health
care through insurance, hospitals, and clinics in the Pacific Northwest. The
Health District is a small governmental “special district,” like a school,
water, or fire district, located in Newport, Oregon. The Health District
operates a hospital and several clinics, with twenty-five million dollars in
assets and an operating income of twenty-five million dollars; it is a
relatively small provider of health care. In 1999, the two institutions
developed an “affiliation agreement” that later went through several major
amendments, providing for a transfer of facilities, personnel, and services to
Providence, which would then operate the facilities through the Health
District while continuing to tax the district’s citizens.
A group of citizens (the Ad Hoc Committee) became concerned that they
would lose local governance of their health care institutions and that
services would be curtailed in light of the religious principles of the Roman
Catholic Church. The group held meetings, exchanged correspondence, and
planned litigation.19 Ultimately, it was not the citizens but the two hospitals
that filed a suit seeking to validate the agreement in the form of a
declaratory proceeding. Settlement negotiations failed, and the case went to
trial in December of 2000. Providence and the Health District both filed
briefs with the court. The day before the Ad Hoc Committee’s brief was
due, Providence and the Health District withdrew their suit. Granting their
request, the court dismissed the case without prejudice, which led to an
appeal that was later withdrawn.20
This capsule summary provides the basis for the following account of the
merger agreement, the issues raised, the development of the litigation and
pleadings, the evidence offered at trial, and the post-trial proceedings.
Throughout the litigation, the position of the merging hospitals was that
they would provide good health care, the agreement was sound and
necessary, and Catholic principles were not material. The Ad Hoc
Committee took the opposite position on the latter two points, arguing that
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the merger was not economically necessary or sound; that it would restrict
existing or potential health care due to the governing Roman Catholic
principles; and that the transfer of the Health District property and
operations would tend to favor Catholics and discriminate against nonCatholics.
Central to the arguments of both sides was to what extent Providence’s
Roman Catholic principles would affect the Health District’s delivery of
health care services.

II. THE ETHICAL AND RELIGIOUS DIRECTIVES OF ROMAN CATHOLIC
HEALTH CARE
A. The Directives as Governance
The Roman Catholic Bishops Association began developing policies for
Roman Catholic health care in the mid-1970s, publishing a set of Ethical
and Religious Directives for Catholic health care services in 1994 that were
refined and further modified during the course of the Newport litigation.21
The Directives are a highly sophisticated, well-articulated, and coherent set
of imperatives reflecting the application of Roman Catholic theology to
Roman Catholic health care institutions. More importantly, they also
represent a political attempt by the Catholic clerical hierarchy to assert its
authority over the Catholic hospital hierarchy in the marketplace of health
care. Because Catholic hospitals must compete in the competitive, secular
business of health services, inevitably, from the perspective of the bishops,
the values and the teachings of the Catholic Church may be compromised.
The Directives are specifically designed to counter that problem and
insulate Catholic hospitals, the billions of dollars in assets and income they
represent, and the millions of patients they serve.
It was not clear at the beginning of the Newport case exactly what impact
the Directives might have if the merger were to go forward. The teachings
of Catholic theology are clear: abortions, assisted suicide, reproductive
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surgery, and artificial reproductive techniques are forbidden; in addition,
family counseling emphasizes natural methods of childbirth. 22 All of this is
understood, as a matter of Catholic theology. But the extent to which these
dictates would operate within the hospital walls of the Health District was
far from clear. The agreement formulated by the two hospitals required the
Health District to accept “Providence’s values,” but it was not a self-evident
reference to the Directives.23 Even if it was, that reference did not
necessarily mean that the Directives would actually control the staff and
services in practice.
Discovery revealed an affirmative answer to these questions: the
Directives are part of Providence’s articles of incorporation, and as such,
they are binding on all staff throughout Providence, including the staff of
the proposed merger. And even if existing services in Newport did not
include services barred by the Directives, the existence of the Directives
would prevent such services from being developed or offered in the future.
For example, the French abortifacient, RU486, was becoming available in
the United States as the litigation progressed. A fair question was whether
it would be made available in Newport if the merger were effected. On
deposition, the answer by Providence officials was a clear “no.” The
Directives would certainly influence and restrict future health services in the
district.
Thus, it is necessary to examine the Directives more closely. It should be
noted that the Directives were being reviewed and toughened by the bishops
as this litigation was underway. In fact, many of the concerns expressed by
the Ad Hoc Committee were shared by the Catholic bishops, but for
different reasons. Paradoxically, both were concerned with how Catholic
teachings would come to play a role in Newport: the Ad Hoc Committee
feared too much religious influence, and the bishops feared too little.
At the time of the litigation, the Directives contained separate “principles
governing cooperation.”24 These principles pertained directly to corporate
mergers, as did the section titled “Forming New Partnerships with Health
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Care Organizations and Providers.”25 The essence of the concerns in that
section had to do with what is referred to as “scandal” in arrangements like
the one proposed in Newport. By “scandal,” the bishops and the Directives
mean an organized compromise of the religious identity of hospitals and a
lessened adherence to Church teachings and precepts.26 The introductory
comments to the “Forming New Partnerships” section reflected a
sophisticated awareness of the interrelated nature of health care systems and
the ways in which Catholic providers become enmeshed therein:
Until recently, most health care providers enjoyed a degree of
independence from one another. In ever increasing ways, Catholic
health care providers have become involved with other health care
organizations and providers.
***
[N]ew partnerships can pose serious challenges to the viability of
the identity of Catholic health care institutions and services, and
their ability to implement these Directives in a consistent way,
especially when partnerships are formed with those who do not
share Catholic moral principles. The risk of scandal cannot be
underestimated when partnerships are not built upon common
values and moral principles. Partnership opportunities for some
Catholic health care providers may even threaten the continued
existence of other Catholic institutions and services, particularly
when partnerships are driven by financial considerations alone.
Because of the potential dangers involved in the new partnerships
that are emerging, an increased collaboration among Catholicsponsored health care institutions is essential and should be sought
before other forms of partnerships.27
As these introductory observations indicate, the Catholic bishops had a
legitimate and sophisticated concern that market forces and the imperatives
of competition, as a necessity for survival, might cause Catholic health care
institutions to compromise their theological principles or abandon their
moral base.
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The Directives themselves confirm the bishops’ concerns and their effort
to maintain a strong voice in the management and provision of health care
services. One directive provides that “[d]ecisions that may lead to serious
consequences for the identity or reputation of Catholic health care services,
or entail the high risk of scandal, should be made in consultation with the
diocesan bishop or his health care liaison.”28 Another requires a bishop’s
approval for any partnership that will affect the mission or religious identity
of a Catholic provider.29 Similarly, participation in such partnerships must
be limited to what is “in accord with the moral principles governing
cooperation.”30 Yet another directive is clear and categorical: Catholic
health care organizations are not permitted to engage in immediate material
cooperation in actions that are intrinsically immoral, such as abortion,
euthanasia, assisted suicide, and direct sterilization.31
On one hand, these Directives are traditional religious imperatives meant
to bind individuals; on the other hand, they are designed to apply to
corporate, commercial, or institutional transactions. The Directives import
a moral imperative and dynamic that would be difficult even for the most
sophisticated corporate executive to implement. Further, they pose the very
real danger of moral ambiguity by drawing distinctions between “formal”
and “material” cooperation, as well as between “immediate” and “mediate”
material cooperation, which constitute lines between right and wrong. The
distinctions may be unclear; the consequence is not. Catholic institutions
and executives in partnership with non-Catholic institutions, such as the
merger proposed in Newport, risk moral error and condemnation.
The practices that might lead to this condemnation are delineated in the
Directives. The bishops emphasize the “healing mission” of Jesus Christ,
beginning with his acts of healing during his lifetime and proceeding
through the teachings of St. Paul to extrapolate a mission for Catholic health
care in the modern world, particularly in serving the poor and the family.32
The diocesan bishop, who exercises responsibilities that are rooted in his
office as pastor, teacher, and priest, implements the mission.33 By this
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declaration, then, the church hierarchy and its representative, the local
bishop, are placed squarely in the context and control of Catholic health
care institutions throughout the country.
B. The Directives as Religion
The content of moral Catholic health care is spelled out in the Directives.
The preamble speaks of addressing Catholic providers in institutional
settings, starting with a general introduction that recaps the healing ministry
of Jesus, addressing the imperatives of serving the poor, reaching the spirit
as well as the body, and specifically involving both laity and the local
bishop.34 Part I of this article deals with the social responsibility of Catholic
health care services; specifically, the first directive declares that Catholic
institutions “must be animated by the Gospel of Jesus”;35 another directive
provides that “Catholic health care services must adopt these Directives as
policy, require adherence to them within the institution as a condition for
medical privileges and employment, and provide appropriate instruction
regarding the directives for administration, medical and nursing staff, and
other personnel.”36
The Directives also deal with “The Professional-Patient Relationship.”37
The introduction to that section reads as follows:
When the health care professional and the patient use institutional
Catholic health care, they also accept its public commitment to the
[C]hurch’s understanding of and witness to the dignity of the
human person. The [C]hurch’s moral teaching on health care
nurtures a truly interpersonal professional-patient relationship.
This professional-patient relationship is never separated, then,
from the Catholic identity of the health care institution.38
These policies are made operational in the directives that follow. For
example, in Directive 24, the bishops declare that a Catholic health care
institution “will not honor an advance directive that is contrary to Catholic
teaching.”39 Similarly, the Directives provide that a woman who has been
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raped should be treated with medications to prevent ovulation or
fertilization if there is no evidence that conception has occurred.40 And
further, it is not permissible “to initiate or to recommend treatments that
have as their purpose or direct effect the removal, destruction, or
interference with the implantation of a fertilized ovum.”41
The significance of Catholic religious teaching becomes perhaps clearest
in Part IV, “Issues in Care for the Beginning of Life.” That section
provides that the Church cannot approve contraceptive interventions that
either purposefully or resultingly render procreation impossible.42
Similarly, “[r]eproductive technologies that substitute for the marriage act
are not consistent with human dignity.”43 Thus, artificial insemination, in
vitro fertilization, and surrogacy are forbidden.44 One directive states
unequivocally, “Abortion . . . is never permitted.”45 The concerns
motivating the prohibition on abortion also motivate the directive that
forbids promoting or condoning contraceptive practices,46 including direct
sterilization for men or women, as well as the directive that forbids prenatal
diagnosis for the purpose of aborting children with birth defects.47
Not surprisingly, in the section of the Directives titled “Issues in Care for
the Dying,” Roman Catholic teaching is emphatically impressed upon
Catholic health care institutions.48 Catholic theology teaches eternal life,
but also that life-prolonging procedures may be rejected if “insufficiently
beneficial or excessively burdensome.”49 However, the introduction to this
section reads, “Suicide and euthanasia are never morally acceptable
options.”50 Directive 57 does recognize that a person may choose to “forgo
extraordinary or disproportionate means of preserving life.”51 Moreover,
the informed judgment of “a competent adult patient concerning the use or
withdrawal of life-sustaining procedures should always be respected and
normally complied with, unless it is contrary to Catholic moral teaching.”52
The Directives draw the line against euthanasia, defining it as “an action or
omission that of itself or by intention causes death in order to alleviate
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suffering.”53 The bar is absolute: “Catholic health care institutions may
never condone or participate in euthanasia or assisted suicide in any way.”54
By their very terms, the Directives are obligatory upon health care
institutions, particularly those that might form new partnerships with nonCatholic institutions. It is easy and dangerous to ignore the profoundly
revolutionary nature of the Directives. Moral and ethical teachings of the
Church have long guided individual communicants of the Catholic faith, but
the Directives transform those teachings and principles from matters of
individual adherence to matters of corporate and community policy.
Health care institutions that are formed or operated in partnership with
Roman Catholic health care providers do not cease to be community
institutions simply by reason of their religious affiliation. They remain
community institutions, receiving fire, police, zoning, and tax benefits, as
well as Medicare and Medicaid funding from a community that is not solely
Catholic, Protestant, Jewish, or Muslim but that is a pluralistic, political
community in a secular nation.
Over the past thirty years, Catholic and all other health care institutions in
this country have become major beneficiaries of public programs of tax
policy and health finance, including Medicare and Medicaid. These
programs do not come with religious tests or content. Catholic health care
institutions, licensed and supported by the public, have a mission to serve in
the public interest.
The Directives pose a direct challenge to this public responsibility.
Clearly, religious groups may practice their faith and be guided by it.
Additionally, if they accept no public benefit, they need accept no public
burdens. But the very purpose of the Directives is to respond to a health
care context that, over the past decades, has interwoven all providers into a
complex health care tapestry. This entanglement poses the danger of
“scandal”55 precisely because there is no escape; all hospitals, including
Catholic hospitals, are in a sense “public.”
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The conflict resulting between the independence of religious institutions
and the public responsibility of every hospital was at the heart of the
Newport litigation. The central issue was how the Catholic principles
would impact the Health District and its community through the merger
agreement. While the language of the Directives is clear, if they are not
implemented, nothing, arguably, is lost: no harm, no foul. Transferring
assets and authority to a religious entity, such as Providence, violates the
First Amendment only if it serves religious purposes or assists Providence’s
religious mission.
Thus, the nature of the Directives is important only in the consequences
of those directives to the Health District and the services and people
affected. The bishops’ fears are real, given the nature of health care in the
twenty-first century, but not every relationship involves scandal or sin.
Competition and the ability to serve God turns at least partly, on the
agreement effected between the Health District and Providence.

III. THE MERGER AGREEMENT
A. The Parties
On June 5, 2000, Pacific Communities Health District (the Health
District), and Providence Health System, Oregon (Providence), an Oregon
charitable, not-for-profit corporation, finalized an Operating Agreement.56
The Health District is an Oregon municipal corporation.57 It is a
governmental unit created under state law with elected officials, the power
of eminent domain, and taxing authority.
At the time of the agreement, the Health District was profitable. The
Health District owns a general hospital, with forty-eight beds, as well as
related health care facilities in Newport, Oregon.58 It also operates
outpatient clinics in Newport and in the neighboring towns of Walport,
Depoe Bay, and Toledo.59 While the Health District would be considered a
small health care provider, it did offer a full range of services, with the
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exception of abortions, which became significant later. However, in the
realm of reproductive services, the hospital and the clinics did make
available family planning and reproductive services, including laparoscopy.
Providence, in contrast, is a major provider of health care in the Pacific
Northwest, with millions in assets and tens of thousands of employees.60
The specific party to the agreement was Providence Health System,
Oregon.61 The Oregon unit of Providence has a health plan insurance
company, four hospitals, a number of treatment facilities, and several clinics
mostly in western Oregon and chiefly in the Portland area.62 Also, by all
accounts, its services are high quality. Significantly, Providence is a
Roman Catholic organization and, by a specific provision in its articles of
incorporation, its services are subject to the Directives of the Roman
Catholic Church as summarized above.63 Consequently, Providence did not
offer a range of services that would otherwise have been offered by a
general provider of health care.
It may be worth noting that the National Catholic Bishops Association
was not itself a party to the Operating Agreement.64 This is significant
because the Bishops’ Council, the group of Catholic bishops responsible for
drafting the Directives, has interests that diverge from those of Catholic
health care providers such as Providence. The providers function in a
competitive marketplace. The Bishops’ Council operates in a world of
theology and church-based politics; it is suspicious of the motives and
initiatives of Catholic health care systems. For instance, it became apparent
through discovery and trial that the health care providers and the Bishops’
Council were, in many respects, more at odds with one another than the
litigants themselves.
The litigants included the parties to the Operating Agreement (the Health
District and Providence) on one side and an Ad Hoc Committee of citizens
on the other. The Ad Hoc Committee consisted of ten citizens from the
Newport area, two of whom had served on the board of the Health District.
The Ad Hoc Committee was diverse. One member had been the director of
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social services for the county, another had set up reproductive counseling
services for the state of Oregon, another was a nurse, another was a social
worker, and another (the only male) was a businessman and real estate
developer. The Ad Hoc Committee’s concerns about the agreement
included the following: the loss of local governance, the inadequate
economic terms, the potential loss of services, and the merger of private
religious and governmental interests contrary to the state and federal
constitutions. The spectrum of concerns was quite broad, and the Ad Hoc
Committee made it clear that they were not an abortion rights group.
Because Newport is a small, isolated, coastal community, the members of
the Ad Hoc Committee were well acquainted with the executives, staff, and
governing board of the Health District. Moreover, they came to know the
administrators of Providence either through negotiating sessions or pretrial
discovery proceedings. Inevitably, personalities bruised, nerves became
frayed, and hostility was generated. In a small community, the proposed
merger loomed large and exacerbated the pressure cooker quality of the
litigation.
B. The Terms of the Agreement
The agreement povided that “[p]ursuant to ORS 440.360, the [Health]
District is authorized to enter into business arrangements and relationships
with public or private entities….”65 There were further recitals to the effect
that the Health District had decided that there were “clinical, economic and
administrative synergies to be gained by affiliating with a major health care
system,” and the Health District had decided that Providence qualified.66
The Operating Agreement between the Health District and Providence
had been called an “Affiliation Agreement” in an earlier iteration.67
Counsel for the Ad Hoc Committee had sent, in February of 2000, a lengthy
letter that critiqued the document.68 In response, the Health District and
Providence revised the document in significant ways, entitling it an
“Operating Agreement” instead.69 Significantly, the earlier Affiliation
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Agreement had made specific references to Providence’s adherence to the
Roman Catholic Ethical and Religious Directives;70 these references were
deleted in the subsequent Operating Agreement.71
The final agreement, the one that was ultimately challenged at trial, was
not styled as a merger agreement; rather, it was styled as an operating
agreement. Indeed, the form of the agreement provided that Providence
would simply be “operating” the health care services of the Health District
on behalf of the Health District. Such a management agreement, if it had
been genuine, might well have survived the challenge. A religious manager
can serve just as well as a sectarian manager so long as the services are
managed in a nonsectarian fashion. Under a true operating agreement,
Providence would simply receive a fee, possibly a commission, for
operating the Health District’s services, property, and employees.
Instead of a simple transaction fee for a service, the Operating Agreement
transferred far more than operating control to Providence. The Health
District was substantially merged into Providence; Providence was granted
not only all of the Health District’s facilities, personnel, patients, operations
and income, but also the Health District’s taxing power. The governing
board of the Health District would continue to exist but as a subunit of
Providence. Governmental capabilities of the Health District, notably
taxation power, were now subject to Providence’s control. If it was an
operating agreement, it was so only in the sense that Providence would
operate the government.
1. Transfers to Providence
All Health District facilities, personnel, revenues, and services were to be
transferred to Providence, whose consideration in return would be to
operate them and to keep revenues. The agreement was to be a cooperative
effort in which “Providence is responsible for providing local health care
services at the Hospital and the [Health] District provides the facilities in
which that can occur and monitors the performance by Providence of its
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duties under this agreement.”72 The recitals went on to provide that
Providence and the Health District would cooperate to provide support to
each other, and that Providence was “committed to sustaining and
enhancing the depth and breadth of those services now offered by the
[Health] District.”73 The recitals emphasized Providence’s goal to conduct
local decision making for the governance and leadership of the hospital.74
The agreement went on further to describe its terms. A lease for all of
the Health District property was provided in the agreement. The name of
the hospital was to be changed to “Providence Pacific Communities
Hospital.”75 The term of the agreement was to be from July 1, 2000, to
December 31, 2029.76 On the effective date of the agreement, the Health
District was to transfer its current assets and liabilities to Providence, with
certain exclusions provided later in the agreement.77 The Health District
was to retain all long-term assets, liabilities, and restricted funds, including
title to and ownership of the leased property, the capital improvement and
replacement funds, and liability for general obligation refunding bonds.78
The agreement further provided that Providence would use and operate
the leased property for the purposes of a general acute care hospital and
outpatient clinics in the central coast service area.79 Providence was
forbidden from using the leased property or any working capital for any
other purpose without prior written consent from the Health District.80
Presumably, this requirement was written to forestall transfer of property or
application of proceeds to some of Providence’s other hospitals or facilities
elsewhere in the state.
2. The Parties’ Obligations
The transfers to Providence were substantial in value, scope, and
quantity. In exchange for receiving all of the facilities and services of the
Health District, Providence agreed to operate those facilities and services.
This point bears restating: the consideration (i.e., payment) from Providence
for the Health District’s transfer was that they would accept the transfer and
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operate the facilities. The benefits of the agreement for Providence seemed
to outweigh those for the Health District. While Providence undertook
other ill-defined obligations, there was no quid pro quo for millions of
dollars in value transferred by the Health District.
On the effective date of the agreement, Providence was to establish a
board known as the Central Coast Service Area Community Council (the
Community Council).81 Its function was to provide leadership and
oversight of health care operations within the Health District.82 The
agreement specifically provided that the Community Council was not a
legal entity; rather, it was created to assist in the “governance and
management” of Providence.83 It is important to note that the agreement
provided that the Community Council “shall operate in accordance with the
policies, mission, and values of Providence.”84 This statement appears to be
an oblique reference to the Directives.
The functions of the Community Council were to provide oversight of the
quality improvement programs, to provide a credential link between the
Health District and Providence, to review and approve amendments to
medical staff bylaws, and to [t]ake appropriate action with regard to other
responsibilities as may be delegated by the Board of Providence from time
to time.”85 The Community Council was also to provide “advice, counsel
and direction” concerning community needs for health services, facility
operations, financial performance, and strategic direction for the central
coast area.86 Significantly, the Community Council was to recruit for
membership responsible persons who shared the mission and values of
Providence,87 which was another indirect reference to the Directives. The
members of the Community Council were to be appointed by Providence in
consultation with the Community Council.88 The Council was to have at
least eleven members with no more than two members appointed by the
Health District.89
During the lifetime of the agreement, the Health District’s board would
continue to exist but in a subordinate role. The board would receive and
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review reports and information concerning the delivery of health care
services submitted by the Community Council or Providence.90 The Health
District’s board would also monitor Providence’s performance and submit
any requested changes in goals, objectives, health care service delivery, or
operations of the Health District to Providence and the Community
Council.91 Additionally, the board would review and approve all master site
development and facility plans or projects created by Providence involving
total expenditures in excess of twenty-five thousand dollars.92
Providence would determine the feasibility of extending its health plan
and managed-care options to the central coast service area and would also
seek to maintain an open physician panel in that region.93 In order to make
that determination, Providence would undertake several obligations. For
example, Providence would establish and maintain a community cancer
center, as feasible; it would determine the feasibility of radiation therapy
services in the central coast service area between 2004 and 2009; and it
would conduct periodic assessments of health services in the central coast
service area by determining the feasibility of many of those services and
assessing the need for medical office space.94 Curiously, Providence would
also seek to obtain the release of the Health District from its obligations
under agreements with physicians and various departments including
pathology, radiology, emergency medicine, and electrocardiography.95
Providence’s level of control is evidenced by the provision in the
agreement that provided, “Providence shall be responsible for the total
operation of the hospital.”96 Moreover, the agreement provided that
Providence could adopt its own employment policies with respect to
employees, and that “Providence shall offer employment, at Providence
Pacific Communities Hospital, at their current level of compensation to all
current employees of [the] District of the Effective Date, in accordance with
Providence’s standard policies and procedures.”97
The recital of the Health District’s responsibilities was brief in
comparison to the recital of Providence’s responsibilities. Significantly,
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there were two provisions that later raised concern. First, the Health
District was obligated to “[u]se its best efforts to maintain its operating tax
levy on all taxable property within the jurisdictional boundaries of the
District in order to provide the funds needed by the District to support the
District’s operations and fund the provision of indigent care and other
services by Providence….”98 Second, the Health District was required to
“[m]aintain primary responsibility for financing all master site development
and capital construction and improvements….”99 To this end, the Health
District would use its best efforts to obtain voter approval of general
obligation bonds, and it might request “financial assistance from Providence
for master site development and capital construction and improvements.”100
Two financial undertakings are significant. One was by Providence to
invest not less than one million dollars in a mutually acceptable project for
new diagnostic or therapeutic capabilities within twenty-four months.101
The investment was to be drawn from funds other than working capital or
revenues generated in the central coast service area.102 The second
undertaking involved the parties’ agreement to cooperate in an effort to
maintain the district-operating tax levy. From that levy, $450,000 would be
allocated to reimburse Providence for charity care, uncompensated
Medicaid and Medicare charges, community health programs, medical
education, and residency training.103 The total tax levy was estimated to be
approximately $560,000.104
The agreement provided that while the Health District retained ownership
of all facilities, properties, and equipment, it would “commit a portion of its
Capital Improvement and Replacement Fund (the Reserve Fund) to
implementation of master site development . . . and the construction of
medical office space.”105 The Reserve Fund totaled twelve million dollars
in capital reserves, and the Health District had the right to maintain a
balance in the Reserve Fund of only two million dollars.106
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3. Religious Directives
The agreement provided that “[e]ach party will perform its duties under
the terms of this Agreement in a manner consistent with the party’s
philosophy, mission, policies and values.”107 Copies of these policy
statements were appended to the Operating Agreement as Exhibit C.108
While an earlier draft had made explicit reference to the Ethical and
Religious Directives of the Catholic Church, the Operating Agreement and
the appended Exhibit C carefully avoided such a reference. The
incorporation of the Directives only became explicitly clear as a part of
Providence’s articles of incorporation through discovery, deposition, and
production.
At the end of the agreement there were provisions for termination.109
Significantly, the agreement provided that “[i]f at any time…Providence is
required to operate the Hospital in a manner that is not consistent with the
philosophy, mission, policies and values of Providence,” Providence may
terminate the agreement upon sixty days’ notice.110 If the operational
management of the clinics placed Providence in a conflict with its
philosophy, mission, policies, and values, the agreement provided that the
“operation or management of the Clinics may revert to the operation or
management of the [Health] District, if the parties mutually agree.”111 The
agreement then provided that “[t]he parties may also consider the option of
transitioning employed physicians to private practice as a means of
resolution without termination of this Agreement.”112
The agreement thus transferred all of the Health District’s facilities,
personnel, services, and patients to Providence, where the principal
consideration (other than creating a diagnostic center) given by Providence
was to operate them. Those operations would have to be consistent with
Providence’s mission and values. As noted, the importance of that
consideration was reflected several times in the agreement. The importance
was heightened in a relatively small community where the consideration
included not only the operation of the hospital and clinic services but also
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rental space for the Health District’s medical offices for physicians and
other professionals, who were required by the agreement to be members of
the hospital’s medical staff or other health professional staff. Thus, the
agreement and the values it implemented would have a profound impact on
health care services throughout the small city of Newport, the Lincoln
County area around it, and a significant portion of the rural seacoast of
Oregon.
C. Objections to the Merger Agreement
Both earlier and final versions of the Operating Agreement raised
objections that were communicated to the Health District’s board prior to
the litigation in the Newport case. On December 23, 1999, counsel for the
Ad Hoc Committee wrote to the Health District board members to
communicate the committee’s opposition to the earlier proposed Affiliation
Agreement.113 The essence of the committee’s objections would also apply
to the subsequent revision, and the objections are conveyed in the following
quotation from that initial letter:
In summary, the Committee’s position is that the proposed
agreement with Providence (a) unconstitutionally transfers
management of a public institution to a religious group, subjecting
public assets, services and taxing authority to religious policies and
principles; (b) unconstitutionally provides support to that same
religious group, by that same transfer and by a continuing
obligation to use public taxing authority to fund future operations
and construction on Providence’s behalf, excessively entangling
public authority with private, religious governance; (c)
unconstitutionally curtails or burdens reproductive services and
counseling by delegating public decision making to private,
religious management; (d) contrary to Oregon statute, effects a
merger and/or a partial liquidation of a public hospital district
without required public process, review and approval and a
delegation of District taxing authority to a private, religious group;
[and] (e) contrary to Oregon court decisions, does so on terms so
favorable to Providence as to constitute an abandonment of public,
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fiduciary responsibility, beyond the authority of the officers of the
District.114
Following this communication, there were exchanges between counsel
for all parties as well as an effort to make a presentation to the Health
District’s board. Unfortunately, the board declined to extend more than a
few minutes on their public agenda at their regular meetings. The
preliminary draft of the Operating Agreement was reworked into the final,
which was critiqued in a letter by counsel for the Ad Hoc Committee in
similar terms to those stated above; the letter was sent to the chair of the
Health District’s board on February 17, 2000.115
Despite efforts at resolution, the positions of the parties did not shift, and
litigation ensued. But it was not, as one might anticipate, initiated by the
objecting citizens.

IV. THE LITIGATION: PRETRIAL
A. Pleadings
1. Choice of Forum
The issues posed by the merger between Providence and the Health
District were fairly clear. Control and operation of a public entity by a
religious entity raises First Amendment religion issues under the United
States Constitution. These issues are independent of the possible effect on
available services and operations. The Ad Hoc Committee argued that the
availability of certain services would also be influenced, and this raised
health care issues under the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S.
Constitution. These federal concerns could also be grounded on the Oregon
Constitution116 and could be raised by title 42 of the United States Code,
section 1983, in either state or federal court.117 In addition, there were state
law questions as to whether a special public district, such as the Health
District, could be operated by a private entity. There was also the question
of whether the merger was a waste of public resources. These state law
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questions could be raised pendent to the constitutional issues in either
federal or state court.118
The possibility of filing in either federal or state court raises important
issues involving choice of forum. As a general matter, civil rights and
public interest attorneys prefer federal court.119 Federal court is generally a
better forum for civil rights litigation because it offers a more rigorous
selection process for judges; a more favorable docket in terms of volume
and speed; a greater array of resources available to the judge; a greater
familiarity with constitutional issues; and insulation from such political
issues as those that were posed in the Newport case. In this case, the choice
was between the Oregon Court of Appeals and the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. The Ninth Circuit was preferable for the
reasons noted above and for its reputation as perhaps the most liberal bench
in the federal judiciary.
Generalizations, however, are always subject to exceptions. A suit in
federal court in the Newport litigation would have been assigned to the
southern unit, which at that time also meant a conservative judge.120 An
appeal through the Oregon Court of Appeals to the Oregon Supreme Court
would have involved one of the most highly regarded state supreme court
benches in the country. A state court trial, however, would have been heard
(as it ultimately was) by a trial judge inexperienced in complex
constitutional issues, with a crowded docket, limited resources, and, not
surprisingly, an equally limited patience and tolerance for the efforts of pro
bono counsel.121 The best choice was federal court, and Portland in
particular, which had a more favorable federal bench.
Instead, the Health District filed in state court in Newport, Oregon. The
reason for this choice of forum may be surmised. The considerations
favoring federal court disfavored the Health District and Providence.
Perhaps counsel were more familiar with the state court processes, which is
often true when counsel represents local governmental units in civil rights
cases. Certainly another important consideration involved the logistics of
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resources and travel. If the case had been brought and tried in federal court
in Portland, then counsel, support services, and many of the expert
witnesses would have been readily at hand, convenient to the court house.
In contrast, filing in Newport meant a three-hour drive for conferences and
court appearances. While this was a burden for both sides in the case, the
financial resources of the corporations made the burden easier to bear. The
same was not true for uncompensated, pro bono counsel and witnesses.
2. State Court Petition and Notice
As noted, the Ad Hoc Committee did not get to file its civil rights action
in federal court. Instead, the Health District filed in state court, seeking a
declaratory judgment by invoking a procedure ill-adapted for resolving
issues. On March 15, 2000, the Health District filed a Petition for Judicial
Examination and Judgment (the Petition),122 terming it a validation
proceeding.123 The Health District requested the local trial court to “enter a
judgment that all actions taken and proceedings conducted by the [Health]
District and the Board in connection with the [Operating] Agreement are in
compliance with the provisions of applicable laws including, without
limitation, all relevant constitutional provisions, statutes and regulations.”124
The Health District further prayed that a judgment be entered that the
agreement and the transactions were “valid and legal” under the provisions
mentioned.125
The only parties named as plaintiffs were the members of the board of the
Health District, the first named being Gary Hoagland.126 They sued “as the
Board of Pacific Communities Health District.”127 There were no
defendants, and the members of the Ad Hoc Committee were not referred to
anywhere in the body of the Petition.128 Notice of the judicial proceeding
was to be published, stating that a petition had been filed praying that the
court approve proceedings of the board:
[U]ndertaken and proposed in connection with the District’s efforts
to enter into an operating agreement with Providence Health
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System—Oregon (“Providence”), under which the District has
agreed to lease and transfer operation, but not ownership, of certain
of its real and personal property to Providence, and to transfer
certain current assets and liabilities to Providence, in exchange for
which Providence has agreed to use and operate such property in a
mutually agreed upon manner and in accordance with all
applicable laws, in order to assure that quality health care services
continue to be available to residents of the District.129
The notice closed by telling any interested person that he or she could
appear and contest by filing an answer.130
The notice gave no hint of the magnitude of the proposed merger.
Nothing was said about the millions of dollars of annual revenues and assets
being transferred, or that these transfers were to continue for a term
approaching thirty years. Nothing was said to convey the reality that
Providence was giving little in return for these transfers, other than a
commitment to make good faith studies and to possibly develop a
diagnostic center. There was no hint in the notice that the governance of the
Health District would be radically altered under Providence’s control. Most
significantly, there was no suggestion that Providence operated under a set
of religious Directives that might restrict or preclude services. If a reader of
the notice had gone to the clerk’s office to read the Petition, there would
have been little in the Petition itself to alert the reader. The Petition was
vague, and a member of the public who ventured to read the whole Petition
would not have been given proper notice of the significance of the issues or
the parties to the Petition.
The Petition had two additional exhibits. Exhibit B was entitled
“Principles of Affiliation” and consisted of the Health District’s generalities
for setting criteria for selecting a merging partner, but it in no way provided
a rigorous test for a partner or indicated whether that partner was restricted
in religious terms.131 Exhibit C contained the Operating Agreement
itself.132 A person who struggled through the almost seventy pages of the
Operating Agreement might then come to another exhibit reciting the core
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values of Providence to continue “the healing ministry of Jesus in the world
of today.”133 Among the core values listed were compassion, justice,
respect for the dignity of persons, excellence, and stewardship.134 There
was no reference made to the Directives of the Catholic bishops.
This was a curious pleading and proceeding. The Health District
believed, or asserted, that it was proceeding in rem, but in rem proceedings
are generally directed toward physical objects, such as real property or boats
when the title or disposition of the property are in controversy. In this case,
a whole course of past negotiations and an entire course of an
administration and corporate merger, yet to be undertaken, were the subject
of the validation proceeding. The court was asked to pass judgment on the
transfer of a complex business, involving millions of dollars in assets and
proceeds, thousands of patients, and the merger of a governmental unit into
a religious corporation. The state statutes invoked were actually intended,
and previously used, only to resolve specific and limited municipal action
such as the building of a public building or the imposition of a specific
tax.135 Clearly, the corporate merger proposed between the Health District
and Providence was quite different. It presented an ongoing, flexible
relationship of unclear scope, duration, and content, lasting for decades.
Most significantly, an in rem or declaratory procedure must be
accompanied by the best notice possible and must be calculated to alert the
greatest number of interested parties.136 For the Newport case, this certainly
would have included people in Newport as well as health care providers
elsewhere in the state. But the notice published was opaque at best and
deceptive in its suggestion that the proposed agreement and declaratory
judgment were routine matters of little consequence. On the morning of the
hearing challenging the notice, the defense counsel for the Ad Hoc
Committee stopped for breakfast at the Embarcadero, a restaurant in
Newport. When asked why he was in town, he explained the suit and notice
and asked the waitress if she read the local newspaper. She replied,
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“Regularly. But this is the first I’ve heard we were selling our hospital.
Don’t let them get away with it.”
B. Responsive Pleadings
After the Health District filed its petition to validate the proposed merger,
Providence filed a motion to intervene.137 Plainly, the motion to intervene
was appropriate. Indeed, an argument could be made that the Health
District’s petition could be dismissed for failure to join indispensable
parties had Providence not itself intervened.138 The motion to intervene was
granted as a routine matter.
The Ad Hoc Committee appeared, through Corrinne Williams, Barbara
Davidson, and Norman Johnson, and moved to dismiss.139 At this point the
committee also became known as the “defendant.” Essentially, the grounds
for the motion to dismiss were threefold: the notice had been
constitutionally defective and failed to comply with U.S. Supreme Court
case law under the due process clause; the Health District lacked statutory
authority to effect an agreement that would transfer governance to a private
party and transfer substantial assets without compensation; and the
agreement would violate not only the establishment clause and the freedom
of religion clause of the state and federal constitutions, but would also
violate the provisions assuring rights of personal autonomy and
reproductive choice.140 The motion to dismiss also contended that the
agreement would restrict services either presently provided or possibly
desired in the future, because of the religious principles of Providence, as
articulated in the Directives.141
The procedural challenge, particularly to the deficiencies in the notice,
seemed well taken. For purposes of raising that challenge, the Ad Hoc
Committee carefully filed a special appearance. The substantive challenges
were well grounded, but it was possible that the judge believed that the facts
needed to be developed by discovery and further arguments on motions for
summary judgment. That is what ultimately happened, but a decision
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granting the motion to dismiss seemed appropriate because on its face the
Operating Agreement turns over not only assets but also the government
itself to a religiously affiliated and governed body. The Operating
Agreement and the case seemed well designed for a ruling on the face of the
pleadings, dismissing the Health District’s claim. However, the motion to
dismiss was denied. No reasons were given.
On June 8, 2000, the Ad Hoc Committee filed an answer and
counterclaim.142 The answer detailed the services that were presently
available through the Health District as follows:
Presently, the [Health] District offers an array of in-patient, outpatient and clinic health care services, including surgery. It has, or
could develop, the capability of providing facilities and services
involving contraception, family planning, birth, reproductive
[services], sex education, sterilization, abortion, end of life,
withdrawing life support and physician assisted suicide and has, or
could, develop community and professional education programs
concerning these subjects. The [Health] District has public,
fiduciary and statutory authority and responsibility in these matters
for its residents, such as [the] defendant[].
While these
responsibilities may be shared with other agencies, they may not
be abandoned or wholly delegated by the [Health] District under
Oregon law.143
The answer also made specific reference to the importance of the
Directives to the Providence health system and to the proposed agreement,
as follows:
The Agreement several times, by its express terms, requires that all
operations under the Agreement shall be consistent with
Providence’s philosophy, mission, policy and values, which are
thus made binding on the District, under the agreement. As a
Roman Catholic Church sanctioned health care provider,
Providence’s mission, policies, philosophy and values are subject
to the authority of the Roman Catholic Church and its American
Bishops Conference’s Ethical and Religious Directives. Though
these are not fully presented in the Agreement, an earlier version
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expressly referred to the Catholic Church’s publication of the
Ethical and Religious Directives (Exhibit A), developed by the
American Bishops Conference, governing health care and detailed
the full scope of their operational implications upon the District’s
health services.
Providence and the Sisters of Providence are required by Roman
Catholic doctrine to limit and/or prohibit in significant ways the
full range of medical or health care services they might offer under
Oregon law. These limitations restrict and/or prohibit services and
personnel in the areas delineated . . . above. These restrictions
apply throughout the Providence system, including its managed
care and contracted services, its leased facilities and those
occupying them. Under the proposed Agreement, the District’s
facilities, services and personnel will become part of the
Providence system, and therefore subject to the Ethical Directives.
In addition to the restriction on services, the imposition of religious
administrative authority will restrict religious freedom of Catholic
employees and non-Catholic employees.144
The answer then went on to allege the factual basis for the constitutional
and statutory objections to the merger agreement, as follows:
Defendant[] believe[s] and allege[s] that the Agreement with
Providence (A) transfers governmental assets to a religious group,
making it a more viable entity; (B) visibly and symbolically
identifies governmental authority, facilities and services as those of
a religious group; (C) tends to establish religion and prefer one
religion over another; (D) subjects government authority and state
treasuries funds to a private religious group; (E) excessively
entangles government and religion in the administration of
services, personnel and facilities; (F) restricts present and future
health care services and decision making along religious lines; (G)
will deter people from seeking such services in the future, placing
an undue burden on their rights to those services; and (H) divides
the community politically along religious issues.
Defendant[] believe[s] and allege[s], under the Agreement, that
those seeking services detailed … above will have to travel to seek
them outside the [Health] District, at considerable expense, delay
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and difficulty. They may ultimately be deterred from seeking
those services, constituting an undue burden on those patients.
Further, those services detailed . . . may become effectively
unavailable anywhere in Oregon if the [Health] District completes
its Agreement with the Sisters of Providence, as part of
Providence’s pattern and practice of aggressively acquiring other
hospitals in Oregon and the Pacific Northwest. This process of
acquisition now reaches previously independent medical groups in
the Newport area, by sale or contract with the [Health] District.145
Providence would operate the Health District’s facilities subject to
Roman Catholic limitations, and the Ad Hoc Committee had a direct
interest in the matter, as taxpayers, residents, professionals in the fields of
social services, health care and health care administration, and former
members of the District Board of Directors.
The first claim for relief in the answer and counterclaim was that the
Operating Agreement established religious entanglement by transferring
governance to Providence, by transferring assets which would strengthen
Providence financially, and by committing taxing and bonding authority to
Providence.146 The second claim was that the merger agreement was
subject to Roman Catholic values, which would restrict, on religious
grounds, the availability of health services and infringe on the freedom of
religion while limiting constitutionally grounded rights to health care and
reproductive freedom.147 These limitations pertained to health care rights,
both at the beginning and at end of life, and to the rights and interests not
only of patients but also of hospital and clinic employees. A third claim
alleged that the Health District Web site had maintained a public forum
function but had excluded the Ad Hoc Committee from access and
participation.148
The Ad Hoc Committee concluded by seeking relief in the form of
damages, injunctions, and attorney’s fees, preventing the Health District
and Providence from executing or carrying out the proposed agreement. In
addition, the Ad Hoc Committee sought a constructive trust on the Health
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District reserve fund, amounting to eight million dollars, to prevent it from
being transferred to Providence. They requested a trial by jury on all of the
claims for relief.149 Appended to the Ad Hoc Committee’s answer and
counterclaim were the Directives.150 These were incorporated by reference.
They had not been included, or even mentioned, in the Petition or
Providence’s motion to intervene.
The District and Providence responded to the Ad Hoc Committee’s
answer and counterclaim. The responses primarily consisted of denials of
recitations that the petitioners (the hospitals) lacked requisite knowledge or
information sufficient to form a belief. Significantly, petitioners did admit
that the Directives are part of the philosophy, mission and values of
Providence Health Systems of Oregon, and that Providence would operate
the Health District as part of its larger health care system. The petitioners
also admitted that lawful abortions would not presently violate the terms of
employment at the Health District hospital and that therapeutic abortions
had been performed from time to time, but that after the effective date of the
operating agreement, Providence would not perform direct151 abortions at
the hospital or clinics.152
The final phase of the pretrial pleadings involved cross-motions for
summary judgment. These were preceded by extensive discovery in the
form of production of documents and depositions of various individuals.
C. Discovery
In a sense, the merger agreement between Providence and the Health
District posed no factual issues for discovery. The conduct of the plaintiffs
was clear: they had effected an agreement, and the agreement spoke for
itself, as did the articles of incorporation. Additionally, the Directives were
clear and unambiguous on their face. All parties agreed that these operative
documents comprised the sum total of the relationship between the Health
District and Providence. The state and federal constitutional issues as to
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religion and reproductive rights were clearly posed by the text of these
documents.153
Therefore, on its face, this case seemed to possess little need for
discovery. The parties to the agreement maintained that they had legal
authority to consummate the arrangement and that the agreement did not
violate statutory or constitutional provisions of Oregon or the United States.
The opponents of the agreement argued that the agreement constituted an
establishment of religion and the preference of a religious group; further,
the agreement would restrict health care services. These are legal issues
that would not seem to require factual exploration, instead they would only
need analysis under relevant constitutional principles. However, a number
of factual issues became necessary to determine the final outcome of the
case.
For instance, the nature of Providence as a religious entity was not selfevident. The agreement referred to Providence’s principles, and the articles
of incorporation referred to the Directives, which were self-evident religious
principles. But, the extent to which those principles were implemented by
Providence, or even influenced Providence in any significant way, needed
to be established. Providence, surprisingly, maintained that any impact of
the Directives on its operation of the Health District’s services was de
minimis.
Providence was an integrated health care system, including an insurance
plan, a number of hospitals, a number of physician groups, and a number of
clinics and free-standing service facilities. Providence operated in several
states and employed well over ten thousand people. It did not, and could
not by federal and state law, discriminate in terms of religion in its hiring or
its services. Regardless of the Directives, from the perspective of a patient
or a consumer, the service or treatment in most instances would seem the
same as that provided by a for-profit and governmental, academic, Catholic,
Jewish, Lutheran, Mormon, or Seventh-Day Adventist facility. Similarly,
from the perspective of an employee, the terms and conditions of daily labor
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were unlikely to be limited by or conditioned upon religious observance or
even remotely influenced by the religious mission. An X-ray technician, a
brain surgeon, a dietician, or a physical therapist at Providence would have
an experience virtually indistinguishable from other institutions.154
The significance of the religious mission of Providence was not so much
in what it did as in what it chose not to do. The potentially discriminatory
impact of the religious mission on staff or patients needed to be explored.
More importantly, it was necessary to establish whether Providence’s
control of the Health District would mean an end to existing services or the
preclusion of possible services, which residents could and would rightfully
expect from their government.
The Ad Hoc Committee’s position was that the agreement would turn
management and governance over to a Roman Catholic institution that
would, in turn, exclude important services that would otherwise be
available. It was not clear, however, what those services were or whether
they had previously been available or whether Providence would actually
deny them. Obviously, the Directives expressed a restrictive view as to
health care at the beginning of life and at the end of life, in addition to
issues surrounding family planning, reproductive freedom, and counseling.
Factually, it was unclear that the Health District had ever offered the
services that the Catholic Church found repugnant such as abortion. If these
services did not exist under the previous scheme, arguably, nothing would
be changed under the new agreement. Thus, the ultimate question was the
impact of Providence’s governance within the Health District. Would the
Church be running the government? Would the government be operating
under religious principles? How would decision making and policy setting
be conducted within the Health District and within Providence?
The ways in which the agreement merged the government into
Providence’s structure and yet kept the Health District and its taxing powers
alive were important in two respects. The first important aspect was that
religion was controlling government in ways that research suggested were
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unique.155 Another important element was that the relationship created an
entanglement between governmental and religious institutions, forbidden by
First Amendment case law.156 But in both of these areas, matters of degree
were important, and those turned upon facts, and that was a matter for
discovery.
Another problematic area for factual development was the parties’ intent
regarding religious principles in the delivery of health care. Clearly, the
parties knew that Providence was a Roman Catholic entity, but this did not
necessarily mean that they intended to advance Roman Catholic values.
Indeed, the publicly elected directors of the Health District might well have
chosen Providence simply because, among an array of the other religious
and secular institutions, Providence could provide the best health care.
Similarly, the Providence executives, in effecting the arrangement with the
Health District, might have intended to advance the delivery and
distribution of health care services, as opposed to advancing the religious
teachings of the Roman Catholic Church. Even if the effect of the
agreement were to establish religion or prefer a religion but the intent of the
parties was otherwise, then arguably the challenges to the agreement would
fail.157
An important subsidiary issue was the role of the local bishop, as he
would be the Catholic functionary, if any, who would implement the
Directives. But if he chose not to, or if Providence ignored him, then the
Directives would be irrelevant. The Directives were clearly national in their
scope and application, but whether this was true of their enforcement was
not clear. It was also unclear who would be charged with enforcement,
what sanctions would be employed, or which deviations would be tolerated.
Indeed, prior to discovery, it was not even known whether agreements such
as these required prior approval from the bishop and, if so, whether such
approval had been obtained.158
A final area for factual exploration surrounded the economic necessities
and benefits of the agreement. If the agreement was not necessary, then the
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Health District was simply conferring a benefit upon a religious group
without justification. Similarly, if the benefits to the Health District from
Providence were negligible or dubious, then there would be no public
benefit to the Health District, but a benefit would be improperly conferred
upon a religious entity.
The Health District argued that it needed the agreement with Providence
for a number of purposes such as synergies in communications, as well as
procurement, training, delivery of services, and economies of scale.
Conversely, the Ad Hoc Committee maintained that the needs and benefits
were negligible and insignificant. Such factual disputes require testimony
on matters of constitutional facts—those considerations central to a
constitutional concept or rule that may or may not be present in a particular
case, or those relationships and consequences that trigger constitutional
prohibitions or guarantees.159 What seems to be an easy application of a
written constitution to a written agreement instead becomes a difficult
exercise in factual advocacy.
It is clear from this analysis that discovery had to examine three different
sets of facts: (1) the impact that religious principles would have on services;
(2) details of how the merged entities would operate; and (3) the economic
merits of the agreement. The Ad Hoc Committee had to be prepared to
argue that the effects would be unconstitutional and that even if that were
not so, the arrangement itself was unconstitutional. The latter proposition
also required factual exploration by discovery, prior to motions and
arguments on summary judgment.
Discovery proceeded without incident. Production included a range of
documents and financial statements. Depositions were addressed to eight
individuals, including the CEO of Providence, John Lee; the ethicist for
Providence, Father John Tuohey; the president of the Health District’s
board, Charles Perry; the executive director of the Health District, Michael
Fraser; and three of the members of the Ad Hoc Committee, Corrinne
Williams, Barbara Davidson, and Norman Johnson. The transcripts of these

CORPORATE ETHICS AND GOVERNANCE IN THE HEALTH CARE MARKETPLACE

Merger of Religious and Public Hospitals

depositions were attached to the defendant’s motion in opposition to
summary judgment, as well as the defendant’s cross-motion for summary
judgment.
The testimony at trial was largely consistent with and repetitive of the
depositions and discovery. The depositions were offered in the argument of
the motions for summary judgment in support of the Ad Hoc Committee’s
position: the Directives would control Providence, Providence would
control the government, and the agreement was bad in both its content and
its consequence.
D. Summary Judgment Proceedings
1. Cross-Motions
On October 13, 2000, Providence moved for summary judgment on the
basis that there were no genuine issues of material fact concerning the
issues raised in the motion.160 It is worth reflecting briefly on this motion
for summary judgment. The effect of such a motion is to cut off a citizen’s
right to an evidentiary hearing and right to a jury trial. Because it bypasses
important proceedings and terminates important rights, a motion for
summary judgment should be cautiously approached and reluctantly
granted. Moreover, in order to find no material issue of fact, summary
judgment must rest upon facts developed through the appropriate process,
as by interrogatories or depositions.
Rather than relying on the discovery and depositions that had raised
important issues of fact about which the parties disagreed, the motion that
Providence submitted relied on an affidavit of Mark May, an executive who
had never been deposed.161 In fact, May’s affidavit had never been seen
prior to its submission as part of Providence’s motion. Indeed, May was
unknown on the record until his appearance by affidavit; thus, there had
been no cross-examination or any opportunity to rebut his claims. May was
the Regional Director of Physician Services; had worked for Providence
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since 1980; and was responsible for strategic primary care development,
clinic leadership, and affiliation with other hospitals.162 May had been the
primary contact with respect to the Operating Agreement with the Health
District.163 His affidavit recited that Providence owned a number of
hospitals and that they had been recognized by various crediting agencies as
offering excellent care.164
The May affidavit went on to recite that a board of directors actually
governed Providence, although the not-for-profit corporation’s sole member
was the “Sisters of Providence-Mother Joseph Province,” whose Mother
House is located in Montreal.165 The majority of the board members and
the current president of Providence were not Sisters.166 (Indeed, it was
asserted that the President was not even Catholic.)167 Of the thirteen
thousand Providence employees in Oregon, approximately ten were Sisters,
and May estimated that “the proportion of Providence employees who are
Catholic is about the same as the general population.”168 His affidavit
alleged that no bishop or other Church official “holds any position in the
governance or management of Providence.”169 May’s affidavit further
claimed that Providence was a Catholic health care system and recognized
the Directives as containing “certain ethical principles that guide Catholic
health care providers in the provision of health care services” and “certain
restrictions on the reproductive and end-of-life health care services that may
be performed.”170 The affidavit avowed that although Providence is
sponsored by a religious community, “the health care services that
Providence will provide under the terms of the Operating Agreement will
not [be] religious in nature.”171
May asserted that Providence was one of the largest providers of health
care services in Oregon, offering a full range of health care services.172 The
affidavit further stated that Providence “employs and provides health care
services to persons of all different races, creeds, religious affiliations and
economic means” and “has adopted a strict policy of respecting each
person’s autonomy.”173 May also discussed Providence’s policy of focusing
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on patients’ spiritual needs and pointed out that many of the hospital
chaplains are not Catholic.174 May closed his affidavit by stating that as a
provider of health care services in the Health District, Providence did not
intend to promote any particular religious belief or practices.175
Attached to May’s affidavit were the Operating Agreement; the Articles
of Incorporation of the Sisters of Providence, which stated as one of its
purposes “[t]o do any and all other things in furtherance of . . . the teachings
and laws of the Roman Catholic Church and the Ethical and Religious
Directives for Catholic [h]ealth [c]are [f]acilities as promulgated by the
local bishop”;176 the Directives; and a table published by the Oregon Health
Care Division with data that in each of the years 1995, 1996, and 1997,
between 130 and 150 residents of Lincoln County had obtained abortions in
Benson, Lane, Marion, Multnomah, and Washington counties. Also
attached were Providence Health System publications describing their core
values as relating to the providence of God and the five core values of
compassion, justice, respect, excellence, and stewardship.
May subsequently filed a supplemental affidavit on October 13, 2000, to
which the Resolutions of the Board of Directors of Pacific Communities
Health District was attached.177 The resolution recited that because of rapid
changes in health care services and because of an unstable financial
environment, the Health District had solicited proposals from four health
care systems—Providence, Samaritan, Legacy, and Peace Health.178 After
evaluating the proposals, the board decided to proceed with Providence.179
May’s affidavit constituted the total factual basis on which Providence
sought summary judgment.
In response, the Ad Hoc Committee filed a cross-motion on summary
judgment.180 The cross-motion recited that it was supported by the
Operating Agreement, the Directives, and the articles of incorporation, all
of which were attached to the motion for summary judgment.181 More
importantly, the defendant’s cross-motion was supported by the depositions
of a number of people examined prior to trial, numbering several hundred

VOLUME 3 • ISSUE 1 • 2004

267

268 SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE

pages of sworn testimony, given in the presence of opposing counsel,
subject to cross-examination.182 The defendant also submitted the 1998 and
1999 Financial Statements of the Health District and its February 17, 2000,
letter analyzing the Operating Agreement discussed above.183 The
defendant specifically reserved issues of material fact from the request for
summary judgment; additionally, the committee opposed the petitioner’s
motion for summary judgment with respect to these issues:
(b) those portions of the First Claim for Relief which turn upon
material factual issues, as to which there is a good faith dispute for
which testimony may be required, including allegations…as to
future church/state entanglement and governance issues and…as to
future impact on services, consumers and providers in the
community, issues which may be raised by implementation of the
Operating Agreement; (c) those portions of the Second Claim for
Relief concerning religious restriction of health services which turn
upon material factual issues, as to which there is a good faith
dispute for which testimony may be required, including allegations
. . . as to the destructive impact throughout the [Health] District
and . . . on future health policy and service, issues which may be
raised by implementation of the Operating Agreement.184
The defendant Ad Hoc Committee’s summary judgment motion recited
that it was based on the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S
Constitution, as well as Article I of the Oregon Constitution and the state
statutes governing special districts such as the Pacific Communities Health
District.185 The last paragraph of the motion specifically provided,
In addition to the federal constitutional grounds for judgment . . .
[the Ad Hoc Committee] seek[s] summary judgment for the further
reason that the Operating Agreement would violate Oregon statutes
and the Oregon Constitution…by transferring business assets
without sufficient need or adequate compensation, by failing to
follow proper procedure in so doing, and by adopting policies on
health care, particularly abortion and physician-assisted death,
contrary to state law and policy.186
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The defendant’s motion for summary judgment specifically incorporated
by reference the analysis and state law authority contained in a separate
memorandum that was submitted by the amicus curiae American Civil
Liberties Union.187
The Ad Hoc Committee’s cross-motion on summary judgment was in
sharp contrast to the motion submitted by Providence. It identified and
specifically reserved from summary judgment issues as to which material
factual dispute existed.188 More importantly, it relied upon and specifically
incorporated extensive factual material developed during discovery by
production and deposition.189 The significance of this cannot be overstated.
The Mark May affidavit supporting Providence’s motion had never been
seen prior to its submission as a part of the motion. This meant there had
been no cross-examination, nor any opportunity to rebut any of his claims.
In contrast, the Ad Hoc Committee relied on the sworn testimony of known
individuals who had been identified by the parties, examined and crossexamined in each other’s presence. The nature of this evidence was clearly
weightier than that submitted by Providence.190
2. Briefs and Arguments
To defend its effort to obtain summary judgment, Providence submitted a
brief relying on May’s affidavit and the Health District’s resolution. The
brief then recited that under the relevant Oregon rule, summary judgment
was appropriate if the pleadings, depositions, affidavits, and admissions on
file show there is no genuine issue as to any material fact.191 Providence
argued that it did not violate the Oregon statute prohibiting a district from
denying abortion192 because the hospital would not be “operated” by the
Health District under the Operating Agreement. Indeed, Providence would
be operating the hospital and the Health District could permit this since its
purpose—to assure quality health care—was secular. The primary effect
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would also be secular, even though the agreement would aid a churchrelated entity.
As for the constitutional test regarding entanglement as violating the
establishment clause,193 Providence argued that the entanglement must be
with religion, not simply with a religiously connected entity, in order to
constitute a violation.194 Providence argued further that even if certain
forms of health care were lost, there was no right to have abortions offered
by the Health District or its hospitals.195 In any event, the loss of certain
health care benefits would not be the result of discrimination against any
religious group or a penalty for the exercise of religion.
The Ad Hoc Committee of citizens submitted a fifty-six page
memorandum on summary judgment, arguing that this case was distinctive
because the government was enabling a private, religious entity to take over
not only a governmental function, but also a governmental entity.196 In that
sense, it resembled the facts involved in the United States Supreme Court
cases Board of Education of Kiryas Joel Village v. Grumet197 and Larkin v.
Grendel’s Den.198 Moreover, because the Health District retained its
identity as part of the agreement with Providence, it would be adopting
religious symbols and endorsing religious teachings through the changes in
its name and logo and through its endorsement of the Directives. Here, the
Ad Hoc Committee was relying on Santa Fe Independent School District v.
Doe and Lee v. Weisman.199
The Ad Hoc Committee drew attention to the arguments about
government control and symbolism: the agreement meant the Health
District was endorsing the Directives—an endorsement of great symbolic
significance quite apart from the practical consequences of the agreement
itself—which limited services that might be available in the community.
Thus, the effect of the merger on health care services was not controlling or
dispositive; it was simply impermissible for a religiously grounded entity to
control the government, or for the government to endorse or to adopt
religious symbols or teachings. Just as a state supreme court could not post
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the Ten Commandments in its entryway,200 so the Health District could not
endorse, adopt, or enforce the Directives.
The citizens also argued that the agreement with Providence
impermissibly entangled the affairs and operations of government with
religion and favored one religion over another.201 The Ad Hoc Committee
argued that the Health District would have to monitor Providence’s services
and quality, which would entangle it with Providence.202 Additionally, the
Health District had turned over a number of important functions, including
taxing authority and its earning revenue;203 the Operating Agreement
provided that the Health District was subject to the missions, policies, and
values of Providence, which would include the religious Directives.204 All
of this created an excessive entanglement under relevant U.S. Supreme
Court decisions as per the Lemon v. Kurtzman test.205
Apart from the entanglement argument, the Ad Hoc Committee also
claimed that the government wrongly favored one religion by transferring
the assets, cash flow, and patient base to Providence.206 In particular, the
committee emphasized that the transfer of the Health District’s operations
included its employees, who would have to accept a contract imposing the
Directives on their health care services if they wished to remain
employed.207 The committee relied on the U.S. Supreme Court cases Abood
v. Detroit Board of Education208 and Keller v. State Bar of California209 for
the proposition that forcing the Health District employees to accept these
types of changes violated the First Amendment to the United States
Constitution. The Ad Hoc Committee also argued that the agreement
violated Article VI of the U.S. Constitution, which prohibits a religious test
for any office or public trust in the U.S. government.210
Finally, the committee argued that the proposed agreement between the
Health District and Providence burdened their due process rights to health
care services both at the beginning and at the end of life.211 They argued
that the proposed arrangement with Providence would violate state laws that
create an entitlement to health care, as well as federal law, which allowed
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both the right to die and the right to an abortion.212 The Ad Hoc Committee
relied on Roe v. Wade213 and Planned Parenthood v. Casey214 to support
these arguments. Furthermore, the necessity for the merger agreement and
the Health District’s financial condition became relevant, because a burden
on Fourteenth Amendment rights only becomes “undue” if it is
unreasonable.215 The Health District tried to justify the arrangement with
Providence as reasonable because it was financially necessary. The citizens
contended, however, that the Health District was actually in excellent
economic condition and that the arrangement required so little of
Providence that, economically, the arrangement was unjustifiable.
The Health District and Providence both filed responsive motions and
briefs.216 Providence’s reply brief began by observing that it was “up to the
voters, and the voters alone, to decide whether to have a hospital district in
the first place.”217 The argument went on to state that “[t]he statutes don’t
require a district to provide any medical services at all . . . [but] the statutes
allow a district to provide practically any medical services the people
want—and are willing to pay for.”218
Providence’s reply brief then turned to the arguments about religion.
Providence maintained that it was not helpful to speak of “a threatened
“merger”“ because there would be none.219 Rather, “both sides will retain
their identity.”220 Also the governance of the Health District would not be
transferred and replaced by the court’s “religious governance” of
Providence, because the Health District’s board would still “make law for
the District.”221 Providence would not acquire any control over the board of
directors.222 Providence went on to argue as follows: “The opposition
briefs betray deep confusion as to what is government and what is not. The
Health District’s hospital is not government. The hospital is property. It is
a facility. . . .”223 The reply brief also contended that the Ad Hoc
Committee engaged in “inflammatory rhetoric” when it suggested that the
merger agreement would transfer a solvent, valuable system of health care
with no return consideration.224 Providence then quoted from an affidavit
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by the Health District hospital’s chief administrator, stating that it had been
operating at a loss to prove that the Health District was not solvent.225
Providence took issue with the cases cited by the committee and argued that
it relied on cases in which two entities “often in difficult straits, have
employed government to aid them with money, supplies, zoning restrictions
and the like. . . . Providence did not initiate this transaction . . . . Providence
did not seek out the [Health] District for assistance, let alone assist in
pursuing any religious activity. It was rather the [Health] District that
sought help.”226
Providence reiterated its argument that religious purpose was missing in
the merger agreement.227 It distinguished the committee’s reliance on
Kiryas Joel and Grendel’s Den by contending these were cases in which
religious criteria had been explicitly employed.228 As to entanglement
under Lemon v. Kurtzman, Providence cited its earlier argument that the
entanglement has to be in the religious activity of Providence, rather than in
the general activities of a religious entity.229 Providence further argued that
it would operate the hospital and “then operation of the hospital by the
[Health] District necessarily ceases.”230 Providence also contended that
“[t]he Directives may then have some effect on Providence’s operation of
the hospital, but [it] can’t and won’t have any effect on anything that the
[Health] District does, because the [Health] District will not be involved in
the operation.”231 Therefore, Providence argued, the Health District would
not be entangled with the Directives.232
As to the issues of reproductive services and end-of-life services under
the Fourteenth Amendment, Providence argued that the Health District and
Providence were not constitutionally obligated to offer all forms of health
care.233 The fact that there might be a constitutional right to specific forms
of health care did not mean that the Health District or any governmental
unit must offer that health care.
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3. Court Ruling
On November 22, 2000, the trial judge ruled on the motions for summary
judgment.234 After a lengthy review of the pleadings and the arguments,235
the judge first ruled that the Operating Agreement would not violate
Oregon’s abortion statutes and then turned to the state constitutional law
claims stating, “It is my judgment that the question of whether this court
should follow the Oregon Constitution in analyzing the [Operating
Agreement] is one of the most important aspects of this case.”236 He
concluded that under the Oregon statutes, if funds went to a religious
organization as opposed to a religious function, this meant that the Oregon
Constitution had not been violated.237 He therefore held that evidence
should be taken on that question. As to the Directives, the judge agreed
with Providence; similar to other private organizations that might provide
the same health care services as Providence, any benefits flowing to
Providence from the Health District would be used for providing health care
services and not for proselytizing.238 Still, the judge stated that he believed
evidence must be taken to answer the questions of whether under the
Oregon Constitution money would be paid to a religious or theological
institution and whether that money will be “paid for the benefit of” that
institution.239
Turning to the U.S. Constitution and the First Amendment, the judge held
that the purpose behind the Operating Agreement was secular and that its
primary effect was one that neither advanced nor inhibited religion.240
However, he also stated that “the court should hear evidence as to how, why
and whether the [Operating Agreement], during its implementation, would
‘foster an excessive government entanglement with religion.’”241 As to
these issues, the court denied summary judgment, and it held that evidence
would be taken at trial.242 As to free exercise under the First Amendment,
the judge could find nothing in the record to support a violation, but also
remarked, “even so, discretion causes me to opt in favor of taking evidence
on the subject.”243
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The judge then turned to the Fourteenth Amendment issues concerning a
right to health care services at the beginning and at the end of life as a
matter of due process.244 The committee’s argument had been that the
Operating Agreement, by implementing the Directives, would restrict
services offered now or in the future. Moreover, the merger agreement’s
restrictions were unreasonable, and therefore unconstitutional, because the
restrictions were not financially justifiable. The court simply ruled against
these claims, granting summary judgment on the ground that “there is no
federal constitutional obligation that a public hospital provide ‘reproductive
health care and that the failure to do so does not violate the equal protection
or due process clauses.’”245 He added that it was the judgment of the court
that “this hospital, operated by the [Health] District or by Providence, has
the ability to provide that same service to the [Health] District residents but
is not required to do so.”246
The court then outlined the issues for trial. First, under the authority of
the Oregon Constitution, the court thought that there was a genuine issue of
material fact on the following questions: (i) whether the funding to
Providence directed by the Operating Agreement “benefits” Providence as a
religious institution; and (ii) whether the Operating Agreement, in
operation, avoids excessive government entanglement with religion.247
Second, under the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, the court
believed there was a genuine issue of material fact as to (i) whether the
Operating Agreement, in operation, avoids excessive government
entanglement with religion; and (ii) whether the hospital, post-Operating
Agreement, is going to be operating as a “pervasively religious
institution.”248 Finally, as to the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S.
Constitution, the court determined the following: (i) the Operating
Agreement does not cause the impairment or loss of rights that otherwise
existed prior to its execution; (ii) there is no federal constitutional obligation
that a public hospital provide reproductive health care, and the failure to do
so does not violate either the equal protection or due process clauses of the
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Fourteenth Amendment; and (iii) if it is determined at some future date that
the court’s ruling on this subject is incorrect, the court notes that
Providence, a private institution, will be operating the hospital and is
therefore not subject to the Fourteenth Amendment.249
It is not necessary to provide a thorough critique of the decision on
summary judgment because the case proceeded fully to trial; however, a
few points should be noted. The ruling on the First Amendment simply
ignores the establishment issues raised by the enormous, unnecessary
transfer of assets to Providence. Also, the requirement that the Ad Hoc
Committee must prove the hospital would be “pervasively religious” is
nowhere supported in case law.250
As to the Fourteenth Amendment, the judge’s finding that there was no
loss of rights was simply impossible to conclude without testimony, and the
finding that there is no right to reproductive health care ignores the
argument that such health care cannot be denied for religious reasons. As
for the conclusion that Providence is “private” and the hospital would not
be subject to the Fourteenth Amendment (i.e., no “state action”), the judge’s
ruling seems to fly in the face of the Operating Agreement’s terms,251 which
provided that Providence would operate not only the hospital but also the
Health District. Thus, the necessary state action is present in the
governmental ownership and authority taken over and operated by
Providence. The decision is also inconsistent: if there was state action for
the purpose of the First Amendment, then there would be also be state
action for the purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment.252

V. TRIAL AND DECISION
A. Trial Testimony
1. Plaintiffs
The litigation between the Health District and the Ad Hoc Committee
went to trial in November of 2000.253 During a week and a half of trial, the
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parties called as witnesses many of those who had previously been deposed.
The Health District’s witnesses included John Lee, CEO of Providence;
Michael Fraser, CEO of the Health District; Doctors Long and Cely,
president of the Health District’s board and a staff practitioner, respectively;
and Father John Tuohey, a Roman Catholic priest and staff ethicist for
Providence.254 Additional witnesses for the plaintiffs were Dr. Albert Starr,
a noted heart specialist, and Mary Jo Tully, the chancellor for the
archdiocese of Portland.255
Although the CEO of Providence, John Lee, testified at great length, his
testimony was essentially an overview of Providence’s operations.
Furthermore, he deferred to other witnesses for the details concerning the
impact of the Directives on services within the Health District, as well as
how the mechanics and management of the merger would be affected.
However, Lee was clear that the Directives were a part of Providence’s
articles of incorporation and a continuing part of Providence’s commitment
to the healing ministry of Jesus.256 He also stated that the ministry and the
Directives are a constant source of reference for all of Providence’s
operations and personnel.257 Finally, he testified that the tax revenues from
the Health District were essential to making the arrangement economically
feasible.258
Dr. Cely testified that he presently does tubal ligations at the Health
District’s Newport hospital subject only to medical justifications, and that
he provides information for patients seeking abortions, vasectomies, or
contraceptives.259 Tubal ligations are done at the hospital and are
commonly sought after labor and delivery.260 He knew nothing about the
Catholic Directives.261 In addition, he cited no hospital policies banning
abortion, family planning, or physician-assisted suicide.262 Dr. Long, who
had been extensively involved in negotiating the agreement with
Providence, was similarly uninformed about the Directives, although he did
testify they were a continuing source of concern.263 He also confirmed Dr.
Cely’s testimony about existing policies at the Health District facilities.264
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Warranting somewhat greater summary was the testimony of Mary Jo
Tully, the chancellor of the archdiocese of Portland. She testified that the
Directives are reviewed by the Vatican and are a part of health care that
must be complied with.265 The archdiocese would not allow contraception
and tubal ligation.266 If the archbishop does not approve a hospital’s
medical practices, he can ultimately declare that the hospital is not
Catholic.267 Even so, Tully went on to testify that the bishop will not insert
himself into the physician-patient relationship and has no jurisdiction over
the governance or operation of Providence.268 In fact, the bishop had not
been consulted on the contract between the Health District and
Providence.269
Michael Fraser’s testimony was somewhat more detailed as to the
agreement and operations. Fraser, the CEO of the Health District, described
the clinics and the hospital as providing mostly primary care.270 In the
process of deciding whether to affiliate the Health District with Providence,
he testified that there were extensive committees and meetings, followed by
an extensive selection-and-screening process.271 Bids were solicited only
from nonprofit hospitals—Providence, Legacy, Peace Health, and
Samaritan—that were all religiously affiliated.272 These hospitals are all
sizable, good health care providers. No bid was deemed unacceptable, and
Samaritan had recently begun an affiliation with North Lincoln Hospital
nearby.273 Fraser also testified that the Directives would apply to all
physicians having medical staff privileges at the hospital or renting space in
the newly proposed medical office building.274 Furthermore, the Directives
would prohibit abortion and referrals for abortion even if the pregnancy
resulted from rape.275 They would also prohibit physician-assisted
suicide.276 However, he also testified there would be no interference
between physician and patient, because the Directives are not “a rule
book.”277
Fraser’s testimony was crucial on several points: there was no compelling
economic need for the merger, policy and practice would in fact change,
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and governance would pass from the Health District to Providence. Equally
important, the Roman Catholic symbols would be affixed to the Health
District’s buildings and stationery.278 His testimony also revealed that
Fraser himself would be the new CEO of the Health District subunit of
Providence.279
The testimony of Father Tuohey was also of vital importance. While
Chancellor Tully had testified from the perspective of the archbishop, who
knew nothing of the proposed merger, Father Tuohey could testify from
Providence’s perspective. He was well informed about the Directives and
their impact on the mission and operations of the District post-merger.280
Father Tuohey’s testimony may be summarized as follows:281
As a priest/ethicist, [Tuohey] consults on cases under the Religious
Directives at Providence. “The Healing Ministry of Jesus” is an
essential part of Providence’s mission as described in the
Introduction to the Religious Directives. The Religious Directives
bar tubal ligations, but due to medical objections, and would not
permit vasectomies at Providence or in District facilities. A
physician could refer a patient for assisted suicide, but not write
the prescription. “[M]orning after” pills282 and abortions are
prohibited.
The Religious Directives will govern the [Health] District under
the Operating Agreement and [apply] to physicians on Medical
Staff, and to all professionals and patients and all employees.
The Directives would not be enforced on a physician, however.
There is no “snooping.” [The Directives] are very much like ethics
text of Beauchamp and Childress,283 although those are not
“directives” or based on God.
The Directives are implemented by Bishops to promote
consistency of Roman Catholic Theology. [They] are meeting now
to revise the Directives. [T]his Agreement does not require the
Bishop’s approval because it is not a partnership—it is a complete
takeover,284 but the Bishop does know about it.
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The Providence logo and sign have a “corporate cross” with
shading. [T]he cross is the most powerful symbol in Christianity;
it represents in history and theology, Christ’s suffering and its
meaning. [I]t is a central symbol; in churches, in nave, with
stations of the cross, on rosary beads.285
This testimony by Father Tuohey was highly significant because it drew
from his status as a priest and a corporate ethicist. He made it clear that the
Directives would impact the Health District and its services directly and
pervasively.286 The statement that Providence would not, and does not,
“snoop” tends to negate that. But actually, it suggests a very different
reality. Providence was inconsistent in its enforcement of the Directives
and hypocritical by declaring values while debasing them; this
inconsistency was the very danger the National Conference of Catholic
Bishops feared. Virginia Terhaar, a counseling practitioner and a witness
for the Ad Hoc Committee, testified that the resulting ethical dilemma,
along with the basic question of whether she could counsel about abortion
or birth control when dealing with victims of rape, led her to withdraw from
Providence’s referral list of counselors.287
2. Defense
The Ad Hoc Committee’s witnesses included four of its members, each
of whom had health care expertise. Clearly, their opposition was not solely
ideological. One witness had owned and operated health care facilities
(Norman Johnson); another had set up birth control programs for the state
of Oregon (Barbara Davidson); another had been director of the County
Health Department (Hilda Moravick); and yet another had administered
health care programs for the poor (Claudia Webster).288 To add to that,
three witnesses had served on the board of the Health District.289 Each
witness was able to testify to the importance of the health care services that
might be lost if the merger were implemented.290
The testimony of Lois Backus, executive director of Planned Parenthood
of the Columbia-Willamette region, was significant. She gave a state-wide
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perspective on the availability of family planning and reproductive services,
the importance of those services, and the impact of Roman Catholic
institutions on the distribution of such services.291
Another witness testified about loss of services at the end of life. George
Eighmey, Executive Director of Compassion in Dying in Oregon and a
former legislator, testified about the importance of the Oregon Death with
Dignity Act292 and the adamant opposition of the Catholic Church, and
Providence in particular, to the Act’s drafting, adoption, and
implementation.293 From his work counseling dying patients, Eighmey
testified in support of the need for death-support services and the scarcity of
those services.294 In his opinion, the merger agreement would have a
seriously negative impact within the Health District on end-of-life
services.295
Two expert witnesses commented on the nature of Catholic teaching and
corporate culture, tracking the axes of the issues in the case. The first
expert witness was Father Golenski, a former Jesuit priest, who is now a
national health care and bioethics consultant and a member of several
national panels and works with several national health care providers.296
His testimony can be summarized as follows:297
The Religious Directives are due to the Bishops Conference
concern for partnerships of Catholic Hospitals and non-Catholic
hospitals, like this one—a Bishop’s objection would be very
powerful, [and] must give a nihil obstat [before a merger may
proceed.] [T]he application is clear to the Bishops, but may not be
to the hospital. [I]f the District offers prohibited services, there
would be a problem when [the Bishop] learns there are instances
where Bishops have interfered.
Contrary to [Father] Tuohey[‘s testimony], [the] Religious
Directives do apply to the Operating Agreement between
Providence and the [Health] District.
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[The Religious Directives] are under revision presently. They have
been reviewed by the Vatican’s Holy Office and will be reviewed
by the Pope.
The Religious Directives prohibit abortion, tubal ligations, and
morning after pill[s under] a mandate from the Vatican.
[P]hysician-assisted suicide would be “prohibited entirely.” [The]
Religious Directives are not consistent with Oregon policy on
physician-assisted suicide or family planning with the Oregon
Health Plan.
The actual effect may turn on interpretation by a hospital, and the
Operating Agreement is silent on that; but a physician performing a
prohibited service would still be violating the Directives. They
don’t have thought police . . . .
Although religious, Providence gets Medicare funding,298 but not
for religious services.299
Father Golenski’s testimony was thus an effective counterpoint to the
testimony of Father Tuohey, and it was followed by the testimony of
Merwyn Greenlick. Greenlick, who holds a Ph.D. in medical care
organizations, is a former vice president of research for the Kaiser
Foundation Health Plan and chair of the department of public health at
Oregon Health Sciences University.300 His specialty is corporate culture
and decision making.301 An important issue in the case was the extent to
which a set of values, such as the Directives, could permeate and motivate a
large corporation. Professor Greenlick testified that “Providence Health
System is extensively, distinctly, palpably religious and Catholic. Its
message, through symbols [and] prayers, to consultant and patient is
clear.”302
The selective nature of the summary above is partly to illustrate the
necessity for testimony to develop constitutional arguments. Theoretical
abstractions, even when complex, are still relatively easy to state. However,
as noted earlier, proving their application in context is frequently very
difficult. It requires putting witnesses on the stand who could, with
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expertise and competence, testify that religious principles actually motivate
corporations; that services would in fact be lost and that those services are,
in fact, important; that governmental functions would become entangled
with religious practices; and that the government would begin adopting
religious symbols. The testimony as to these and other “constitutional
facts” must be concrete, relating directly to the context and litigants before
the court, yet also address a state of affairs not yet in being.
At some level, all of this becomes a matter, not of theory, but of logistics.
To prove these propositions requires finding witnesses; persuading them to
appear; scheduling around their schedules and the court’s overburdened,
inadequate schedule; carefully phrasing questions that will survive
objection; and drawing answers that avoid mere speculation. These are
problems in any kind of litigation, but they are more urgent and crucial in
pro bono litigation. Pro bono witnesses must frequently be persuaded to
testify without compensation; indeed, they often must bear their own
expense of getting to and from a remote location, perhaps losing a day of
work, to testify.303 The logistical burden for corporate litigants is far less.
They not only have substantial budgets to pay attorneys and to reimburse
their experts, but frequently their witnesses are paid employees, and so their
testimony and travel are part of their jobs.
For public interest litigants, the imbalance of resources and power is
frequently daunting and too plain to ignore.304 One way of correcting the
inequality is by drawing on public advocacy groups such as Planned
Parenthood, the National Organization for Women, and the American Civil
Liberties Union to intervene as litigants or amicus curiae, and to provide
support and attorneys. For reasons never made clear, all but the American
Civil Liberties Union declined to do so in the Newport case.305
But in the end, as with much of public interest litigation, the resources for
the public litigant must be those that he or she brings personally to the
cause. In Newport, the ten members of the Ad Hoc Committee were
exceptionally experienced and articulate professionals. They possessed the
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experience and training necessary to be persuasive witnesses. And, beyond
this, they possessed the credentials to qualify as expert witnesses. The
experience, commitment, and tenacity of each, including those who did not
testify, made it clear from the very outset that the Newport trial would be a
fair fight.
B. Arguments and Briefs at Trial
The court instructed the parties on the close of testimony to submit
briefs.306 The briefs of both Providence and the Health District were
submitted as instructed. The brief of the Ad Hoc Committee was completed
but never submitted because two days prior to the submission date, January
17, 2001, the attorneys for Providence and the Health District announced
that Providence was exercising its option under the agreement to withdraw
from the merger; their view was that the case was moot.307 Subsequently,
the judge instructed counsel to “lay their pencils down.”
The briefs of Providence and the Health District reiterated the parties’
views on summary judgment; these briefs may be obtained from and are on
file with the court. Given the judge’s ruling on summary judgment and the
fact that the Ad Hoc Committee’s brief was never filed, it would be
worthwhile to make the committee’s brief available.308 The brief illustrates
the ways in which the testimony was woven into and supported the
constitutional theory advanced by the Ad Hoc Committee.
The trial brief for the Ad Hoc Committee of citizens focused on the
following arguments: (1) Providence, as a religious institution, was
engaging in state action;309 (2) the Operating Agreement involved religious
discrimination;310 (3) the unconstitutional entanglement of government and
religion was accomplished through the delegation of governmental
authority and public assets to Providence, which dictated services and
policies through religious principles;311 (4) Providence’s policies and the
Directives dictated a loss of certain services;312 and (5) Oregon law
mandated comprehensive health care throughout life and Providence’s
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policies limited services, particularly care for the beginning and ending of
life.313
The record and the brief were sufficient to pose important issues for
decision by the trial judge and the appellate courts, in the event of an
appeal. Neither, however, was to happen.

VI. DISPOSITION AND ATTORNEY’S FEES
A. Hearing on Dismissal
Providence decided to exercise its option under the Operating Agreement
to withdraw from the merger.314 The reasons for withdrawal were never
fully expressed. It seems clear that the contracting parties were not
anticipating the depth of opposition posed by the Ad Hoc Committee or the
delay in consummation posed by the court proceeding. It may also be that
the expense of maintaining the litigation (over $450,000 for the Health
District’s attorneys’ fees,315 and likely an equal amount for Providence) was
not anticipated and thus chilled the ardor of the parties.
In May of 2001, the trial judge entered a judgment of dismissal without
prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The dismissal “without
prejudice” was troublesome, because it meant that the Health District and
Providence could potentially fashion another agreement or simply refile the
validation proceeding that had initiated the litigation. Providence’s
withdrawal and motion to dismiss316 merely required that the agreement
submitted to the court would not be undertaken or enforced.
Nonetheless, the dismissal represented a victory for the citizens who had
opposed the proposed merger. The adamant opposition within the
community made it unlikely that the Health District and Providence would
initiate further steps toward a merger. And, perhaps, just possibly, the
parties were persuaded to reconsider the constitutional validity of the
merger.
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B. Attorney’s Fees
Attorney fees in public interest litigation assume great importance as they
are essential to the assertion of constitutional rights, and they are a
disincentive to those who deny rights. The application for attorney’s fees in
this case was principally based upon 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988.317 Relief
under these provisions is available when a party prevails on a counterclaim
for which the law allows recovery of attorney fees.318 If a lawsuit produces
a voluntary action by the defendant that affords the plaintiff some or all of
the relief requested, the plaintiff prevails.319 In this case, if the committee’s
claims were a catalyst in the decision of Providence to withdraw from the
agreement, which in turn resulted in the dismissal of these proceedings, the
committee would qualify as a prevailing party and, thus, be entitled to
attorney’s fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988. To be a catalyst, there must be (1)
a causal link between the lawsuit and the relief awarded, and (2) a legal
basis for the plaintiffs’ claim.320 It appeared that the committee clearly met
the two-prong test.
The argument and the catalyst theory, however, were short lived, and the
timing of the application for attorney’s fees was ill fated. The application
was filed on June 7, 2001.321 Six days later, the U.S. Supreme Court
decided Buckhannon Board and Care Home v. West Virginia Department of
Health and Human Resources.322 The Supreme Court rejected the catalyst
theory in Buckhannon as follows:
A defendant’s voluntary change in conduct, although perhaps
accomplishing what the plaintiff sought to achieve by the lawsuit,
lacks the necessary judicial imprimatur on the change. Our
precedents thus counsel against holding that the term ‘prevailing
party’ authorizes an award of attorney’s fees. 323
After Buckhannon, it was clear that a “prevailing party” is only one who
has been awarded some relief by the court, even if it is a consent decree or
judicially entered settlement.
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The denial of attorney fees in the Newport case and in Buckhannon is bad
policy. Attorney fee awards are an essential aspect of asserting the First and
Fourteenth Amendments in civil rights cases. They are the financing
mechanism for leveling the playing fields of justice. That did not happen in
Newport. Counsel for the Health District and Providence received a
considerable amount in fees, far greater than the amount requested by
Counsel for the Ad Hoc Committee, for filing litigation that ultimately did
not benefit their clients. Counsel for the Ad Hoc Committee submitted a
statement for 600 billable hours ($180,000 at $300 per hour) and received
nothing; no appeal was taken.
The dissenters in Buckhannon got it right: if a litigant may avoid defeat
by simply desisting, possibly to resume at a later time, attorney fees will
rarely be awarded, and a crucial incentive for bringing suit to protect civil
rights will be lost. Worse, if the wrongdoer may initiate a suit, wear down
any opponents, and then walk away as they did in the Newport case, there is
even less of an incentive to appear in defense of constitutional rights or to
seek their protection.324

VII. CONCLUSION
Mergers are the preferred mode of growth in the health care field and are
often necessary for health care organizations to survive. Governmental
providers are designed to meet needs in small, rural communities and often
have difficulty surviving. Catholic health systems, however, are among the
largest in the nation and quite naturally seek to acquire smaller
governmental providers. It is likely, therefore, that the issues raised in the
Newport litigation will recur.
The economics of the agreement were clear: Providence needed the
taxing income of the Health District for the proposed merger to function.
Consequently, Providence kept the Health District in a functioning state, but
as an extension of Providence. The government unit was essentially kept
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intact and was run by a religious entity. This arrangement violated the First
Amendment.
It was this point that was crucial to the litigation. Providence argued that,
as a private party, it was not subject to the First Amendment’s prohibitions;
its services did not involve “state action.” Moreover, Providence argued
that it was not “pervasively religious.” But the nature of the arrangement
with the Health District was that the Health District would be implementing
religious policies, the Ethical and Religious Directives on Health Care.
Moreover, Providence would be absorbing much of the Health District’s
governance into its structure, exercising governmental powers and authority
pursuant to religious principles. This infusion of assets and authority
amounted to establishing religion and creating entanglements even if
services remained unaffected.
Future mergers would benefit from avoiding these features of the
Newport arrangement. Two extremes could serve as safe harbors: either a
simple management agreement or a total sale and merger. Either would
have avoided the witches brew of government and religion that was so
objectionable in Newport. A third possibility is the creation of a third
corporation to manage the public facility, free of the Directives.
The Newport litigation unearthed a surprising reality and tension
surrounding the place of religion under the First Amendment. Within this
tension, the National Conference of Catholic Bishops has profound
concerns about the American Catholic health care establishment; they fear
that the pressures of the marketplace will cause Catholic hospitals to
compromise Catholic principles and engage in “scandal.”325 The testimony
in Newport substantiates these fears. The bishops intend the Directives to
restrict and to direct the activities of Catholic health care throughout the
United States. But Roman Catholic health care constitutes a multibillion
dollar enterprise annually, with its own needs and agenda. The tension
between these two Catholic institutions, health care and the Church, is
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palpable. Indeed, this tension is precisely what the First Amendment is all
about.
Over the last forty years, with the advent of Medicare and Medicaid, the
national health care budget has become largely publicly funded. Over four
hundred million dollars annually is provided through Medicare and
Medicaid—that is through the government to private health care
providers.326 The line between private and public is thereby blurred, as the
government seeks to manage health care and contain cost, as well as
seeking to encourage health care policy in areas like family planning. First
Amendment concerns are inevitably implicated when the recipients of those
federal dollars are Catholic institutions. At the same time, religious
concerns are raised for those who seek to protect the Church and its
ministry from the temptations of public funding.
Paradoxically, the bishops and the Ad Hoc Committee shared a common
concern about the entry of Catholic institutions into the delivery of health
care. From radically different starting points and perspectives, each was
concerned about the compromise of principle resulting from the merger of
government and religion. For both the bishops and the Ad Hoc Committee,
a wall of separation is needed. For each, the problem posed was when
government and religion are dependent on each other, how shall we render
unto Caesar what is Caesar’s and yet render unto God what is God’s?327
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For consistency, we have used health care throughout this article as the preferred
spelling of THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (4th ed.
2000), including instances where healthcare originally appeared in excerpts.
4
Mergers between hospitals, insurers, and other providers, such as pharmaceutical
firms, have become commonplace. What is not as obvious is the volume of mergers
involving church-related providers. The following is a brief list of scholarship worth
reviewing: COHEN & MORRISON, NATIONAL WOMEN’S LAW CENTER, HOSPITAL
MERGERS AND THE THREAT TO WOMEN’S REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH SERVICES (2001);
Donald H.J. Hermann, Religious Identity and The Health Care Market: Mergers and
Acquisitions Involving Religiously Affiliated Providers, 34 CREIGHTON L. REV. 927
(2001); William W. Bassett, Private Religious Hospitals: Limitations upon Autonomous
Moral Choices in Reproductive Medicine, 17 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 455
(2001); Monica Sloboda, The High Cost of Merging with a Religiously-Controlled
Hospital, 16 BERKELEY WOMEN’S L.J. 140 (2001); Lawrence E. Singer & Elizabeth
Johnson Lantz, The Coming Millenium: Enduring Issues Confronting Catholic Health
Care, 8 ANNALS HEALTH L. 299 (1999); Hollie J. Paine, The Catholic Merger Crusade, 2
J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 371 (1999); Jane Hochberg, The Sacred Heart Story:
Hospital Mergers and Their Effects on Reproductive Rights, 75 OR. L. REV. 945 (1996);
Lisa C. Ikemoto, When A Hospital Becomes Catholic, 47 MERCER L. REV. 1087 (1996);
Kathleen M. Boozang, Deciding the Fate of Religious Hospitals in the Emerging Health
Care Market, 31 HOUS. L. REV. 1429 (1995); Lawrence E. Singer, Realigning Catholic
Health Care: Bridging Legal and Church Control in a Consolidating Market, 72 TUL. L.
REV. 159 (1997).
5
Each entity has a Web site that may be visited for much of the factual descriptions
which follow.
The Web site for Pacific Communities Health District is
http://www.samhealth.org (last visited Nov. 15, 2004). The Web site for Providence
Health Systems is http://www.providence.org/home (last visited Nov. 15, 2004. Note
that subsequent to the litigation described in this article, Pacific Communities Health
District affiliated as a “partner” with Samaritan Health System, which had, while the
litigation was pending, worked out a similar arrangement with North Lincoln Hospital,
some twenty-five miles away.
6
The Health District is a special-function governmental unit, like a school, water, or fire
district, with an array of governmental functions and powers, including taxation.
7
COMMITTEE ON DOCTRINE, NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS,
ETHICAL AND RELIGIOUS DIRECTIVES FOR CATHOLIC HEALTH CARE SERVICES (4th ed.
2001), at http://www.usccb.org/bishops/directives.shtml (last visited Nov. 15, 2004)
[hereinafter DIRECTIVES]. The seventy-two Directives and their extensive commentary
are a product of the bishops’ concern for the conduct of American Catholic health care
institutions and target affiliations with proposed mergers.
8
The Ad Hoc Committee’s position was that Providence was religious, and even if it
was not, the agreement enshrined the Directives, thereby entangling the government in
religious doctrines and institutions.
9
In most legal scholarship, text content is footnoted to sources and authorities publicly
available in libraries for hard copy or electronic retrieval. The Newport case and this
article are not subject to such conventional citation given the outcome of the litigation.
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However, a reader who would like to see actual filings or transcripts may do so by
contacting the Court Administrator, Nancy Lamvik (as of 2004), for Lincoln County
Circuit Court, P.O. Box 100, 225 W. Olive St., Room 202, Newport, Oregon, 97365. The
case reference is In the Matter of the Petition of Gary Hoagland, Charles L. Perry, Frank
Armstrong, Carol A. Waters and Doctor David Long, as the Board of Pacific
Communities Health District, No. 00-1227. The court reporter’s notes are retained by the
administrator’s office and transcripts are available at $2.50 per page. Facsimiles of court
papers may similarly be obtained through the administrator’s office.
10
A preferential treatment of religion would simply look at the transfers to Providence
and argue they are not supported by a quid pro quo analysis. The establishment argument
asserts that the agreement has government supporting religion and being managed by it.
11
If it were argued that the agreement created a preference for one religion over other
religions, the opponents would possibly have been required to show intent on the part of
the Health District board to favor one religion.
12
Providence Health System, Our Mission,
http://www.providence.org/phs/about_Providence/default.htm (last visited Nov. 15,
2004).
13
Trial Transcript, Testimony of Father John Francis Tuohey, In re Gary Hoagland, No.
00-1227 (Cir. Ct. Or. filed Mar. 16, 2000) (“[E]thical norms that could only be enforced
by snooping probably ought not to be enforced.”) (on file with the author) [hereinafter
Testimony of Tuohey]. See also infra Part V.A. It was confirmed, in part, by testimony
of the Health District’s professionals that they were unaware of the Directives and
believed their practices after the merger would continue as they were before. Id.
14
The problem posed is commonplace in civil litigation on applications for preliminary
injunctions seeking to avoid future harm. But in those cases, however, there is usually a
past record of abuse or misconduct to which the parties can refer. In the Newport case,
such a foundation was far more difficult to establish.
15
Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954). In Brown, the Court’s central
finding that separate educational facilities are inherently unequal was chiefly established
by reference to scholarly works and not by evidence in the trial record, although
conditions in the local schools had been introduced through witnesses at trial. See id. at
495 n.11.
16
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). In Miranda, the Court’s central finding was
that counsel was crucial to stationhouse interrogation and such interrogation was
inherently coercive. See id. at 466. Manuals instructing police on how to conduct such
interrogations mostly established these facts. Id. 448–49.
17
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 888–898 (1992). In
Casey, one of the Court’s findings was that a small percentage of cases revealed a
likelihood that a husband who was advised that his wife was seeking an abortion would
resort to violence. Id. at 889. A subset of this finding was that husbands could not be
deterred and women would therefore not exercise their constitutional right to choose. Id.
at 890–91. These findings of fact, in addition to several hundred others, were made by
the trial court and supported the conclusions ultimately reflected in Justice O’Connor’s
opinion in Casey.
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18

This overview is necessarily a summary drawn from a number of sources. The best
references for a reader would be the briefs of the parties on summary judgment, as well
as the pleadings themselves.
19
Many of the details of the controversy and lawsuit were reported in the local
newspaper, the Newport News Times. To search the archives of the Newport News
Times, see http://www.newportnewstimes.com/archives/ (last visited Nov. 15, 2004).
20
The docket number for the appeal in the Oregon Court of Appeals is A 114655. The
appeal was withdrawn by the citizens who had appealed on January 11, 2002.
21
See DIRECTIVES, supra note 7. Specific policy statements published by the bishops
and a history of the Directives are given in the preamble and notes one and six of the
Directives. Id. at pmbl., Notes.
22
See generally id. For a detailed discussion of these prohibitions as a group, see id. at
pts. IV–V. For discussion of each prohibition separately, see id. at pt. III, directive 36
(abortion); pt. IV, directive 45 (abortion); pt. V, directive 60 (assisted suicide); pt. IV,
directives 48, 53 (reproductive surgery); pt. IV, directives 40–41, 43 (artificial
reproductive techniques); pt. IV, directive 52 (natural family planning methods).
23
As to the terms of the agreement, see infra Part III.B.
24
DIRECTIVES, supra note 7, at app.
25
Id. at pt. VI.
26
Id. at pt. VI, directive 71. The term “scandal” in this context is a term of art, meaning
confusion or compromise of basic tenets of the Church or faith. Id.
27
Id. at pt. VI.
28
Id. at pt. VI, directive 67.
29
Id. at pt. VI, directive 68.
30
Id. at pt. VI, directive 69.
31
Id. at pt. VI, directive 70.
32
DIRECTIVES, supra note 7, at gen. intro.
33
Id.
34
Id. at pmbl.
35
Id. at pt. I, directive 1.
36
Id. at pt. I, directive 5.
37
DIRECTIVES, supra note 7, at pt. III.
38
Id.
39
Id. at pt. III, directive 24.
40
For a discussion on the treatment of sexual assault victims, see id. at pt. III, directive
36.
41
Id.
42
DIRECTIVES, supra note 7, at pt. IV, intro.
43
Id.
44
Id. at pt. IV, directives 40–42.
45
Id. at pt. IV, directive 45. In addition to totally prohibiting abortion, Directive 45
provides that “abortion . . . in its moral context, includes the interval between conception
and the implantation of the embryo.”
46
Id. at pt. IV, intro.; id. at pt. IV, directive 52.
47
Id. at pt. IV, directive 50.
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DIRECTIVES, supra note 7, at pt. V.
Id. at intro.
50
Id.
51
Id. at pt. V, directive 57.
52
Id. at pt. V, directive 59.
53
Id. at pt. V, directive 60.
54
Id.
55
DIRECTIVES, supra note 7, at pt. VI, directive 70.
56
Operating Agreement between Providence Health System, Oregon, and Pacific
Communities Health District 65 (June 2000) (on file with the Seattle Journal for Social
Justice) [hereinafter OA].
57
Id. at 1.
58
OA, supra note 56, at 1.
59
Id.
60
PROVIDENCE HEALTH SYSTEM, CONSOLIDATED FINANCIAL STATEMENTS 2 (2004)
http://www.providence.org/resources/phs/2003PHSCombined.pdf (last visited Nov. 16,
2004); Providence Health System, A Focus on Excellence Inspired by Mission: The
Good Work 2004 Fact Sheet 3 (2004),
http://www.providence.org/resources/phs/tgw2003/2004FactSheet.pdf (last visited Nov.
16, 2004) (as of 2004, Providence has nearly 33,000 employees).
61
OA, supra note 56, at 1.
62
Providence Health System, Hospitals in the Providence Health System, available at
http://www.providence.org/PHS/Locations/default.htm (last visited Nov. 16, 2004).
63
Restated Articles of Incorporation of the Sisters of Providence in Oregon (May 8,
1991) (on file with the Seattle Journal for Social Justice) [hereinafter Restated Articles].
64
See OA, supra note 56, at 65.
65
Id. at 1.
66
Id.
67
See, e.g., Letter from Corrinne C. Williams, Counsel for the Ad Hoc Committee, to
Gary Hoagland, Chair of Board of Pacific Communities Health District (Feb. 17, 2000)
(on file with the Seattle Journal for Social Justice) (providing a mark-up of the
“Affiliation Agreement”).
68
Id.
69
See OA, supra note 56.
70
See Letter from Corrinne C. Williams, supra note 67.
71
See OA, supra note 56.
72
Id. at 1–2.
73
Id. at 3.
74
Id.
75
Id. at 4.
76
Id.
77
Id. at 4–5.
78
Id. at 6.
79
Id. at 7.
80
Id.
49
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Id. at 9.
Id. at 9–10.
83
Id. at 10.
84
Id.
85
Id. at 11.
86
Id. at 11–12.
87
Id. at 13.
88
Id.
89
Id.
90
Id. at 14.
91
Id. at 15.
92
Id.
93
Id. at 16.
94
Id. at 16–18.
95
Id. at 19.
96
Id. at 29.
97
Id. at 31 (emphasis added).
98
Id. at 23.
99
Id.
100
Id. at 24.
101
Id. at 40.
102
Id.
103
Id. at 42.
104
Id. at 42–43.
105
Id. at 44.
106
Id. at 45.
107
Id. at 28.
108
Id. at C-1, C-2.
109
Id. 54–56.
110
Id. at 55.
111
Id.
112
Id.
113
Letter from Arthur LaFrance, Counsel for the Ad Hoc Committee, to Gary Hoagland,
Chair of Board of Pacific Communities Health District (Dec. 23, 1999) (on file with the
author).
114
Id.
115
Letter from Corrine C. Williams, supra note 67.
116
OR. CONST. art. 1, §§ 2–3, 5. By agreement of counsel, the state law issues were
briefed by counsel for the ACLU in its appearance on the summary judgment motion—its
only appearance in the litigation. That briefing was incorporated by reference in the Ad
Hoc Committee’s filings. Despite repeated requests, neither the ACLU nor any other
public interest group, including Planned Parenthood, NOW, or NARAL, entered the case
in support of the Ad Hoc Committee. Obviously, their stature and expertise would have
been major resources.
117
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2004).
82
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Obviously, the subjects of § 1983 actions and federal jurisdiction are peripheral to the
Newport case, which went forward in state court. Therefore, there is no need to discuss
or to cite to relevant case law for the proposition that, as a First Amendment case, the
Newport litigation might properly have been brought in federal court. The Supreme
Court decisions discussed infra in Part V.B are ample support for that proposition.
119
For over a decade, the author of this article directed the legal services for a national
litigation conference series on federal litigation offered by the Legal Services
Corporation and has also written on the subject of public interest litigation. See generally
Arthur B. LaFrance, Federal Litigation for the Poor, LAW & SOC. ORDER, 1972, at 1;
Arthur B. LaFrance, Federal Rule 11 and Public Interest Litigation, 22 VAL. U. L. REV.
331 (1988); Arthur B. LaFrance, Tobacco Litigation: Smoke, Mirrors and Public Policy,
26 AM. J.L. & MED. 187 (2000). He most recently served as counsel for the American
Cancer Society in the multistate tobacco litigation and served as amicus for the
Northwest Consortium of Law Schools in the conversion proceeding involving Premera
Blue Cross.
120
The judge in Eugene, Oregon, who would have heard cases from Newport, Oregon,
had earlier written an extremely conservative opinion invalidating Oregon’s assisted
suicide law. OR. REV. STAT. § 127.805 (2003). See Lee v. Oregon, 869 F. Supp. 1491,
1503 (D. Or. 1994), vacated by 107 F.3d 1382 (9th Cir. 1997). In contrast, one of the
judges in Portland, Oregon, invalidated a directive by John Ashcroft that criminalized
assisted suicide. Oregon v. Ashcroft, 192 F. Supp. 2d 1077, 1093 (D. Or. 2002), aff’d,
368 F.3d 1118, 1131 (9th Cir. 2004).
121
The point of this article is not to critique the state trial judge who ultimately heard the
case, but it is fair to point out the limitations that he imposed upon counsel. At the
beginning, despite counsel’s response that the Ad Hoc Committee needed a week to
present its case, a single week was allowed for the presentation of both sides. At the end
of the litigation, Providence and the Health District arranged to confer ex parte with the
judge to dismiss the case.
122
Petition for Judicial Examination and Judgment, In re Gary Hoagland, No. 00-1227
(Cir. Ct. Or. filed Mar. 16, 2000) (on file with the Seattle Journal for Social Justice)
[hereinafter Petition]. It recited preliminarily:
In recent years there have been rapid changes in the nature of the delivery of
health care services and in the insurance and government programs that fund
such services, which has [sic] caused great instability and unpredictability in
the financial environment for the provision of health care. Some small health
care providers have been forced to close, and the [Health] District has seen its
financial position erode. In response to these changes, the Board determined
that an affiliation with a large health care system would help reduce costs,
provide support against sudden fluctuations in costs, and generally provide a
more stable environment in which to ensure that quality health care services
continue to be available to residents of the [Health] District.
* * *
Following its evaluation of the proposals, the Board determined unanimously
that the proposal submitted by Providence would best meet the needs of the
District and its residents and best satisfy the goals articulated in The Principles
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of Affiliation. Accordingly, the Board entered into negotiations for an
operating agreement with Providence.
* * *
The full legal name of Providence is “Providence Health System-Oregon,”
which is an Oregon nonprofit corporation that is exempt from taxation under
Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code. The sole member of
Providence is “Sisters of Providence-Mother Joseph Province,” which is the
Northwest geographic region of the Sisters of Providence, a Catholic religious
community with its headquarters in Montreal, Canada. Providence has a long
history of providing high quality health and managed care services in
communities throughout Oregon.
* * *
The negotiations between the [Health] District and Providence continued for
several months, and eventually matured into the Agreement. Under the
Agreement, the [Health] District has agreed to lease and transfer operation, but
not ownership, of certain of its real and personal property to Providence, in
exchange for which Providence has agreed to operate the property in a
mutually agreed upon manner and in accordance with all applicable state and
federal laws in order to ensure that quality health care services continue to be
available to residents of the [Health] District. A copy of the Agreement is
attached as Exhibit C, and is incorporated by this reference.
Id. at 3–4, ¶¶ 9, 12–14.
123
See OR. REV. STAT § 33.710 (2003); OR. REV. STAT § 33.720 (2003). This action is a
statutory vehicle closely akin to a declaratory judgment proceeding.
124
Petition, supra note 122, at 6.
125
Id. at 7, ¶ 4. Hence, the proceeding was styled a validation proceeding; a kind of
declaratory judgment was sought. However, the Health District and Providence named
no defendants, so the proceeding also had the qualities of an in rem or condemnation
proceeding. Although a validation proceeding is a familiar device in municipal law, it
has few counterparts anywhere else in civil or criminal law.
126
Id. at 1, ¶ 1.
127
Id. at 1.
128
See id.
129
Id. at Ex. A.
130
Id.
131
See id. at Ex. B.
132
See id. at Ex. C.
133
OA, supra note 56, at C-2.
134
Id. Obviously, the “healing ministry of Jesus” is a religious concept, but without
more, it is unexceptionable. The “core values” were not offensive to the Constitution or
to the Ad Hoc Committee; rather, it was what these values translated into—the
Directives—that the Committee found objectionable. However, the Directives were not
mentioned in the agreement or the accompanying exhibits.
135
See, e.g., Bd. of Klamath County Comm’rs v. Select County Employees, 939 P.2d 80
(Or. Ct. App. 1997); Drummond v. Oregon Dep’t of Transp., 730 P.2d 582 (Or. Ct. App.
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1986); Rogers v. Lane County, 771 P.2d 254 (Or. 1989); Eustace v. Speckhart, 514 P.2d
65 (Or. Ct. App. 1973).
136
See Mullane v Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950); Eisen v
Carlisle & Jaquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 174–75 (1974); Mennonite Bd. of Missions v. Adams,
462 U.S. 791, 795 (1983); OR. R. CIV. P. 7(D)(6)(a–d).
137
Motion to Intervene, In re Gary Hoagland, No. 00-1227 (Cir. Ct. Or. filed Mar. 16,
2000) (on file with author).
138
OR. R. CIV. P. 29(A)(1); Hudson v. Feder, 836 P.2d 779 (Or. Ct. App. 1992). An
argument might also have been made that the local Diocese was an indispensable party.
It is not clear that Providence was required to intervene, since it was, strictly speaking, a
part of the world against which the Health District was proceeding in rem. The Ad Hoc
Committee declined to intervene and appeared instead as a defendant, more accurately
reflecting its position and avoiding some of the burdens and hazards confronting
interveners.
139
Motion to Dismiss, In re Gary Hoagland, No. 00-1227 (Cir. Ct. Or. filed Mar. 16,
2000) (on file with the Seattle Journal for Social Justice) [hereinafter Motion to
Dismiss].
140
Defandants’ Memorandum on Motion to Dismiss at 1–2, In re Gary Hoagland, No.
00-1227 (Cir. Ct. Or. filed Mar. 16, 2000) (on file with the Seattle Journal for Social
Justice) [hereinafter Defendant’s Memorandum on Motion to Dismiss]. The arguments
and case law underlying the motion to dismiss were developed more elaborately on the
motions for summary judgment and are discussed there. See infra Part IV.D.
141
Id. A separate motion to dismiss was filed pro se by an individual intervener, a
Newport attorney who had initially been affiliated with the Ad Hoc Committee. The
motion to dismiss argued that there was a lack of subject matter jurisdiction, personal
jurisdiction, and sufficiency of summons; moreover, the petition failed to state ultimate
facts sufficient to state a claim on which relief might be granted. The motion to dismiss
challenged bringing the action as in rem. It also maintained that the petition was
proceeding under a statute that unlawfully delegated power from the executive or
legislative branch to the judicial branch. The motion to dismiss maintained that the
Health District lacked authority to bring the proceeding and that notice had been
insufficient to comport with due process. It was denied and ultimately, after filing other
papers and interlocutory appeals, the attorney retained counsel a few weeks before trial.
142
Counterclaims for Damages Injunctive Relief and Attorneys Fees, In re Gary
Hoagland, No. 00-1227 (Cir. Ct. Or. filed Mar. 16, 2000) (on file with the Seattle Journal
for Social Justice) [hereinafter Counterclaims].
143
Id. at 4, ¶ 8.
144
Id. at 5–6, ¶¶ 11–12.
145
Id. at 6–7, ¶¶ 15–16.
146
Id. at 7, ¶¶ 17–21.
147
Id. at 9, ¶¶ 22–27.
148
Id. at 11, ¶¶ 28–32. This claim for relief was subsequently withdrawn.
149
Id. at 15, ¶ 37(f). The Oregon validation statute denied a jury trial, possibly because in
rem proceedings partake of injunction proceedings in equity. See OR. REV. STAT §
33.710, supra note 123. However, the Ad Hoc Committee’s counterclaims were clearly
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the stuff of jury trials. To economize on resources, the claim to the jury was withdrawn.
Contra Counterclaims, supra note 142, at 15, ¶ 37(f).
150
See Counterclaims, supra note 142.
151
The modifier “direct” is unclear. Several people connected with Providence or the
Health District used the term, implying that some abortions are not “direct” and would be
permitted. Perhaps the term “direct” refers to abortions that are for the purpose of ending
a pregnancy, instead of another purpose, such as saving the life of the mother.
152
Significantly, this was one of the concessions between Providence and the [Health]
District regarding changes in practice or policy after the merger. Such a change could
only be attributed to religious principles, found in the Directives. However, later
Providence and the Health District argued that there were no abortions being performed,
and so the “change” was really no change at all. Regardless, the Ad Hoc Committee’s
position was that a change in policy was itself sufficient to trigger constitutional
prohibitions.
153
The reproductive rights claims were closely aligned with the claims concerning
religion, but they were not identical. Even if family planning, abortion, or other
reproductive issues were unaffected by the merger, there would still have been issues
raised by a religious organization that received aid from the government and controlled it.
154
For example, a leading heart surgeon, Albert Starr, so testified at trial. Trial
Transcript, Testimony of Dr. Albert Starr, In re Gary Hoagland, No. 00-1227 (Cir. Ct. Or.
filed Mar. 16, 2000) (on file with the author) [hereinafter Testimony of Starr]. Similarly,
Health District physicians testified that they anticipated no impact on the way they would
practice medicine. Trial Transcript, In re Gary Hoagland, No. 00-1227 (Cir. Ct. Or. filed
Mar. 16, 2000) (on file with the author) [hereinafter Trial Transcript].
155
See discussion infra Part V.B.
156
Again, see discussion infra Part V.B. for relevant Supreme Court decisions under the
Lemon v Kurtzman entanglement standard. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 615
(1971).
157
As the depositions and trial testimony unfolded, it appeared that the [Health] District
had sought proposals only from religiously affiliated hospital systems, although a forprofit hospital was operated in McMinnville, a community only fifty miles away. This
was intentional religious discrimination. See discussion infra Part V.B.
158
Ultimately, Providence’s ethicist, Father Tuohey, testified that enforcement varied
from place to place, while the Diocese’s chancellor (subpoenaed without having been
interviewed by the intervener) testified that the bishop would not interfere. The
Committee’s witness, Father Golinski, testified that the bishop’s nihil obstat was
indispensable, as the Directives themselves essentially provide. See supra Part II.A.;
infra Part V.A.
159
Matters of constitutional fact have been important in such landmark cases as Brown v.
Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954), and Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v.
Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). See Introduction, supra Part I.A.
160
Intervenor Providence Health System-Oregon’s Motion for Summary Judgment, In re
Gary Hoagland, No. 00-1227 (Cir. Ct. Or. filed Mar. 16, 2000) (on file with the Seattle
Journal for Social Justice) [hereinafter Intervenor Motion for Summary Judgment].
161
Id. at 2.
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162

Affidavit of Mark May in Support of Intervenor Providence Health System-Oregon’s
Motion for Summary Judgment at 1, ¶ 2, In re Gary Hoagland, No. 00-1227 (Cir. Ct. Or.
filed Mar. 16, 2000) (on file with the Seattle Journal for Social Justice) [hereinafter Aff.
of Mark May].
163
Id. at 1, ¶ 3.
164
Id. at 2, ¶ 4.
165
Id. at 2, ¶¶ 6–7.
166
Id. at 2, ¶¶ 7–8.
167
Id. at 2, ¶ 8.
168
Id.
169
Id. at 3, ¶ 9. This last point was important, but hardly one that the Directives would
support, except in the most formal sense, or that an aggressive bishop would necessarily
concede.
170
Id. at 3, ¶ 10.
171
Id. at 4, ¶ 13. Of course, all of this was true, in a general way. However, important
concerns were not addressed: exactly how did the Directives impact services, and what
was meant by May’s statement that the services would not be “religious”? The services
were health care, and not to proselytize, evangelize, conduct religious instruction, or
worship (except perhaps in chapels), but if the services were limited or directed by
religious principles in ways nonsectarian hospitals were not, in that sense they were
“religious.”
172
Id.
173
Id. 4, ¶ 14.
174
Id.
175
Id. at 4–5, ¶ 15.
176
Restated Articles, supra note 63, at 1.
177
Supplemental Affidavit of Mark May at 1, ¶ 2, In re Gary Hoagland, No. 00-1227
(Cir. Ct. Or. filed Mar. 16, 2000) (on file with the Seattle Journal for Social Justice);
Resolutions of Board of Directors of the Pacific Communities Health District, Resolution
No. 00-02 (March 2, 2000) (on file with the Seattle Journal for Social Justice)
[hereinafter Resolution No. 00-02].
178
Resolution No. 00-02, supra note 177, at 1. Each one of these hospital systems is
church affiliated. It appears that the Health District deliberately chose not to seek bids
from other nonprofits or for-profit providers.
179
Id. at 2.
180
Defendants’ Cross-Motion on Summary Judgment, In re Gary Hoagland, No. 00-1227
(Cir. Ct. Or. filed Mar. 16, 2000) (on file with the Seattle Journal for Social Justice)
[hereinafter Defendants’ Cross-Motion].
181
Id. at 1–2, ¶ 1.
182
Id. at 2, ¶ 2.
183
Id. at 2, ¶ 3.
184
Id. at 2–3, ¶ 5(b)–(c).
185
Id. at 1.
186
Id. at 3–4, ¶ 6.
187
Id.
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188

Id. at 2–3, ¶ 5(a)–(c).
Id. at 2, ¶ 2.
190
Id. at 1–2, ¶¶ 1–4.
191
OR. R. CIV. P. 47(C) (2003).
192
OR. REV. STAT. § 435.475 (3) (2003).
193
Lemon, 403 U.S. at 615 (“In order to determine whether the government entanglement
with religion is excessive, we must examine the character and purposes of the institutions
that are benefited, the nature of the aid that the State provides, and the resulting
relationship between the government and the religious authority.”).
194
Brief in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment of Intervenor Providence Health
System-Oregon at 18–20, In re Gary Hoagland, No. 00-1227 (Cir. Ct. Or. filed Mar. 16,
2000) (on file with the Seattle Journal for Social Justice) [hereinafter Brief in Support of
Motion for Summary Judgment].
195
Id.
196
Defendants’ Memorandum on Summary Judgment, In re Gary Hoagland, No. 00-1227
(Cir. Ct. Or. filed Mar. 16, 2000) (on file with the Seattle Journal for Social Justice)
[hereinafter Defendants’ Memorandum on Summary Judgment].
197
See Bd. of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Vill. Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687 (1994)
(invalidating a state statute drawing a special school district boundary around a religious
community).
198
Larkin v. Grendel’s Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116 (1982) (invalidating a state statute that
allowed religious institutions to effectively veto a business’s application for a liquor
license).
199
Defendants’ Memorandum on Summary Judgment, supra note 196, at 17 (citing Santa
Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000) (ruling on whether a school district’s
practice of allowing student-led prayer before football games violated the Establishment
Clause); Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992) (holding that clerical members offering
prayers as part of the official school graduation ceremony was inconsistent with the
Establishment Clause)). See also Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984) (holding that a
city had not impermissibly advanced religion by including a crèche in a Christmas
display); County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989) (holding that the display of
a crèche outside a county courthouse without other secular decorations violated the
Establishment Clause).
200
See Moore v. Judicial Inquiry Comm’n., No. 1030398, 2004 WL 922668, at 2–3 (Ala.
Apr. 30, 2004).
201
See Defendants’ Memorandum on Summary Judgment, supra note 196, at 24–31.
202
See id. at 24.
203
See id. at 25.
204
See OA, supra note 56, at 28.
205
See Lemon, 403 U.S. at 615. At this point in their argument, the defendant particularly
looked to Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349
(1975), overruled by Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000); and Agostini v. Felton, 521
U.S. 203 (1997). Defendants’ Memorandum on Summary Judgment, supra note 196, at
26. Agostini recast the Lemon three-part test in the entanglement inquiry as a singular
determination of a statute’s effect and created three primary criteria for determining a
189

CORPORATE ETHICS AND GOVERNANCE IN THE HEALTH CARE MARKETPLACE

Merger of Religious and Public Hospitals

statute’s effect: state assistance advances religion if it (1) results in governmental
indoctrination, (2) defines its recipients by reference to religion, or (3) creates an
excessive entanglement. Id. at 232–233.
206
Defendants’ Memorandum on Summary Judgment, supra note 196, at 31–38 (relying
on Witters v. Wash. Dept. of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481 (1986); Bowen v.
Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589 (1988); and Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1 (1989)).
207
Defendants’ Memorandum on Summary Judgment, supra note 196, at 36.
208
Id. at 35 (citing Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209 (1977)).
209
Defendants’ Memorandum on Summary Judgment, supra note 196, at 36 (citing
Keller v. State Bar of Cal., 496 U.S. 1 (1990)).
210
Defendants’ Memorandum on Summary Judgment, supra note 196, at 36.
211
Id. at 38–54.
212
Id. at 38.
213
Id. at 42 (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)).
214
Defendants’ Memorandum on Summary Judgment, supra note 196, at 42 (citing
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992)).
215
Defendants’ Memorandum on Summary Judgment, supra note 196, at 42–47 (citing
and discussing Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992)).
216
Reply Brief in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment of Intervenor Providence
Health System-Oregon, In re Gary Hoagland, No. 00-1227 (Cir. Ct. Or. filed Mar. 16,
2000) (on file with the Seattle Journal for Social Justice) [hereinafter Reply Brief].
217
Id. at 1.
218
Id. at 2.
219
Id. at 12.
220
Id.
221
Id.
222
Id.
223
Id.
224
Id. at 13.
225
Id. The point at this juncture of the article is simply to report the positions of the
parties, not to litigate them. However it may be appropriate to note that the affidavit had
not been subject to cross-examination; at trial, under cross-examination, Mr. Fraser
agreed that the hospital was solvent and had been consistently in the black over the
preceding years. See infra Part V.A.1.
226
Reply Brief, supra note 216, at 14.
227
Id. at 16–17.
228
Id. at 16.
229
Id. Whatever merit that distinction has in the education cases involved in Lemon, it
has little relevance to instances where, as in the Newport case, the Health District was not
only transferring monies to a church-affiliated entity but also governance of itself,
adopting the religious principles and symbols of the religious entity in the process.
230
Id. at 20. However, ownership still remained in the Health District, as did its identity
and participation in funding and governance within the new Providence structure.
231
Id. at 20–21.
232
Id. at 20.
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233

Id. at 28–36.
Ruling on Rule 47 Motions for Summary Judgment, Memorandum Opinion and
Order, In re Gary Hoagland, No. 00-1227 (Cir. Ct. Or. filed Mar. 16, 2000) (on file with
the Seattle Journal for Social Justice) [hereinafter Ruling on Motions for Summary
Judgment].
235
Id. at 1–15. This part of the ruling is notable for criticizing defense counsel for filing a
summary judgment motion dependent upon lengthy depositions and then preparing and
presenting at oral argument a fourteen-page outline analysis of the issues and that
evidence.
236
Id. at 16.
237
See id. at 18. Of course, this would mean a constitutional challenge could never
succeed where the religious entity’s religious “function” was to do nothing, as with
withholding end of life or reproductive services for religious reasons.
238
Id.
239
Id. at 18–19. Of course, that question is also raised under the First Amendment to the
United States Constitution.
240
Id. at 21.
241
Id.
242
Id. at 22.
243
Id.
244
Id. at 23.
245
Id. at 24.
246
Id.
247
Id. at 26.
248
Id.
249
Id.
250
Cf. Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 892–93. That an entity is pervasively religious is a legal
conclusion rather than an element of the burden of proof the Ad Hoc Committee had to
bear.
251
See generally OA, supra note 56.
252
Cf. Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961) (holding that a lessee of
space in a public parking garage was engaged in “state action” sufficiently to offend the
Fourteenth Amendment by denying service to African Americans).
253
Trial Transcript, supra note 154.
254
Id.
255
Id.
256
Trial Transcript, Testimony of John Lee, In re Gary Hoagland, No. 00-1227 (Cir. Ct.
Or. filed Mar. 16, 2000) (on file with the author) [hereinafter Testimony of Lee].
257
Id.
258
Id. This would be a linchpin of the citizens’ argument concerning state action, as well
as entanglement for First Amendment purposes.
259
Trial Transcript, Testimony of Dr. Cely, In re Gary Hoagland, No. 00-1227 (Cir. Ct.
Or. filed Mar. 16, 2000) (on file with the author) [hereinafter Testimony of Cely].
260
Id.
261
Id.
234
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See id.
Trial Transcript, Testimony of Dr. Long, In re Gary Hoagland, No. 00-1227 (Cir. Ct.
Or. filed Mar. 16, 2000) (on file with the author) [hereinafter Testimony of Long].
264
Id.
265
Trial Transcript, Testimony of Mary Jo Tully, In re Gary Hoagland, No. 00-1227 (Cir.
Ct. Or. filed Mar. 16, 2000) (on file with the author) [hereinafter testimony of Tully].
266
Id.
267
Id.
268
Id.
269
Id.
270
See Trial Transcript, Testimony of Michael Fraser, In re Gary Hoagland, No. 00-1227
(Cir. Ct. Or. filed Mar. 16, 2000) (on file with the author) [hereinafter Testimony of
Fraser].
271
Id.
272
This, of course, is religious discrimination—an independent basis for challenging the
Agreement quite apart from the many arguments about entanglement and service and
funding of religion. See infra Part V.B.
273
That affiliation is now complete, and as a result the Health District signs reflect the
name of the hospital as Samaritan Pacific Communities Hospital.
274
Testimony of Fraser, supra note 270.
275
Id.
276
Id.
277
Id.
278
Id.
279
Id.
280
See Testimony of Tuohey, supra note 13.
281
Editor’s Note: This summary was taken from Defendants’ Closing Brief rather than
from the actual trial testimony in part because the Seattle Journal for Social Justice does
not have the entire trial testimony on file.
282
Chiefly RU-486, an abortifacient, widely used in Europe but under consideration for
use in the United States by the FDA at the time of this litigation. The Catholic Church
would similarly oppose use of hormonal cocktails to prevent implantation of a fertilized
egg.
283
See generally TOM. L. BEAUCHAMP & JAMES. F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF
BIOMEDICAL ETHICS (5th ed. 1979). This is a comprehensive review of the content and
history of ethical and moral philosophy, and it develops basic concepts such as
autonomy, beneficence, non-maleficence, and justice. In no sense is it a prescriptive set
of mandates like the Ethical and Religious Directives.
284
The agreement was not, in fact, a “complete takeover.” Even if it were, the last four
Directives express a concern for “scandal”—that is, moral compromise and confusion—
which would apply to either partnerships or “complete takeovers.” Significantly,
Providence and the trial judge had, for other purposes, found that there was not a
complete takeover, thereby avoiding attributing state action to Providence’s running of
the hospital.
263
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285

Defendants’ Closing Brief at 11–12, In re Gary Hoagland, No. 00-1227 (Cir. Ct. Or.
filed Mar. 16, 2000) (on file with the author) [hereinafter Closing Brief].
286
See Testimony of Tuohey, supra note 13.
287
Trial Transcript, Testimony of Virginia Terhaar, In re Gary Hoagland, No. 00-1227
(Cir. Ct. Or. filed Mar. 16, 2000) (on file with the author) [hereinafter Testimony of
Terhaar].
288
Trial Transcript, supra note 154.
289
Id.
290
See id.
291
Trial Transcript, Testimony of Lois Backus, In re Gary Hoagland, No. 00-1227 (Cir.
Ct. Or. filed Mar. 16, 2000) (on file with the author) [hereinafter Testimony of Backus].
292
OR. REV. STAT. § 127.800 (2003).
293
Trial Transcript, Testimony of George Eighmey, In re Gary Hoagland, No. 00-1227
(Cir. Ct. Or. filed Mar. 16, 2000) (on file with the author) [hereinafter Testimony of
Eighmey].
294
Id.
295
See id.
296
Trial Transcript, Testimony of Father John Golenski, In re Gary Hoagland, No. 001227 (Cir. Ct. Or. filed Mar. 16, 2000) (on file with the author) [hereinafter Testimony of
Golenski].
297
See supra note 281.
298
The significance of Medicare funding is deceptive. Providence technically receives
Medicare payments only because Medicare patients choose to use its hospitals or
managed care plans. For HHS to prevent this would be religious discrimination; to allow
it, of course, is not establishing religion, because it is the patient’s choice. In contrast, the
Health District was transferring money, facilities, and its very governance directly to
Providence, a far more direct and comprehensive transfer.
299
Closing Brief, supra note 285, at 8–9.
300
Trial Transcript, Testimony of Merwyn Greenlick, In re Gary Hoagland, No. 00-1227
(Cir. Ct. Or. filed Mar. 16, 2000) (on file with the author) [hereinafter Testimony of
Greenlick].
301
Id.
302
Id.
303
Again, this raises the considerations that made federal court an attractive venue in this
case, although the travel and attendance burdens on the clients would then have been
greater.
304
In Newport, each of the corporate petitioners was represented by a large, experienced
trial firm that had one senior partner, one junior associate, and one paralegal in the
courtroom throughout the trial. The wall was lined with lawyer boxes. The flow of
exhibits was nonstop and elegant. This is not the biggest display that the author has
faced; in the tobacco litigation, there were eighteen attorneys in the courtroom during one
day. See articles cited supra note 119.
305
Brief of Amicie Curiae, In re Gary Hoagland, No. 00-1227 (Cir. Ct. Or. filed Mar. 16,
2000), http://www.aclu-or.org/litigation/newport.htm (last visited Nov. 20, 2004).
306
Trial Transcript, supra note 154.
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See Joel Gallo, Providence Backs Out of Affiliation Agreement with Pacific
Communities, NEWPORT NEWS-TIMES, Jan. 19, 2001, available at
http://www.newportnewstimes.com/articles/2001/01/19/general/news-03.txt (posted on
Feb 26, 2004).
308
A copy of the original may be obtained on the Seattle Journal for Social Justice Web
site at http://www.seattleu.edu/sjsj.
309
Closing Brief, supra note 285, at 17–29. The brief notes the following:
[T]he [Health] District proposes a partnership with Providence under an
Operating Agreement which will terminate employment of any employee
refusing to accept the Roman Catholic Religious Directives imposed by
Providence. This is clear discrimination against people on religious grounds.
Discrimination favoring Roman Catholic beliefs is equally clear: governance is
shared with Providence, subject to the Directives; religious endorsement and
symbols will be institutionalized; present and future services will be limited by
Catholic Religious Directives; the administration of the Agreement will require
ongoing entanglement of the District and Providence, not only to sort out the
impact of the Religious Directives on needed medical services, but also to
work out huge ambiguities in performance requirements. . . . This is a
governmental involvement—state action—with a pervasively religious entity.
Defendants do not claim that Providence is “pervasively religious” in the sense
that all aspects of its operations are somehow religious. No entity is all only
one thing. Catholic schools or HMO’s or hospitals or orphanages are not only
about religion. They provide services much like those of their nonreligious
counterparts. What distinguishes them are their governing religious principles,
and the impact on consumers, employees and services. In the realm of
church/state analysis under the Constitution, any arrangement is invalid if it
discriminates in favor of religion or helps a religiously-grounded entity in its
religious mission. Both of those are true here, even though much—perhaps
most—of what Providence does is health care done elsewhere.
Id. at 17–18.
310
Id. at 30–45. The brief further notes the following:
The symbolic endorsement of religion in this case is remarkable in at least two
respects. Unlike any other Providence hospital, the sign in Newport will have
not just the Providence name and location (e.g., Providence/Milwaukee) but
the name of a governmental agency as well. The name will be “Providence
Pacific Communities Hospital” . . . . When asked, Norman Johnson, an
experienced health care administrator and former District Board member,
easily identified the logo as conveying a joint partnership of government and
religion. Indeed, that is the arrangement created by the Operating Agreement.
This linkage of government and religion will be conveyed also by the new
letterhead and all promotional materials—Providence Pacific Communities
Hospital.
* * *

VOLUME 3 • ISSUE 1 • 2004

305

306 SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE

The decisions of the United States Supreme Court are uniform; government
may not adopt religious symbols or employ or display them. Such symbols
may range from endorsing doctrine to adopting logos, as in this case, to
espousing religious teaching, such as [t]he Ten Commandments, or sponsoring
prayer, such as The Lord’s Prayer. Each of these, in some degree, involves the
practice of religion. But all have in common the centrally offensive element of
endorsing religion. Thus, most recently, in Sante Fe Independent School v.
Doe, 120 S. Ct. 226 (2000), the Supreme Court invalidated a practice of
student led, student-initiated invocations prior to football games at a Texas
high school.
The opinion by Justice Stevens found the practice
indistinguishable from that invalidated in Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577
(1992), where a prayer had been delivered by a Rabbi at a middle school
graduation. To some extent, both prayer exercises were invalidated because
they were coercive of the people in attendance. But the fact that only one
prayer was permitted at a time was equally troublesome, since it singled out
that point of view for favorable endorsement.
Id. at 36–38.
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Id. at 46–66. The brief continues:
First, substantial governmental authority and functions have either been
delegated to, or shared with, Providence by the [Health] District Board.
Second, services and policy are restricted on terms dictated by the religious
principles of Providence, and The Healing Ministry of Jesus. Thirdly, an
irresponsibly favorable transfer of assets and aid to a religious body, The
Sisters of Providence, is being made, on terms and under circumstances
assuring unconstitutional entanglement between government and religion. . . .
The most important transfer, in this case, is not in the financial, physical or
service levels. It is on the governmental level. The [Health] District is a
governmental unit, charged by Oregon law with health care responsibilities to
[Health] District residents. . . . Those responsibilities have now been largely
delegated to, or shared with, a religiously-affiliated hospital chain. Whether
present services or personnel will be adversely affected is simply irrelevant.
The delegation itself is government action, emphatically subject to religious
controls and criteria. The subordination of public authority to religious
decisionmaking [sic] suffices to offend the Oregon and [U]nited States
Constitutions, as tending to establish religion.
Id. at 46, 48.
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Id. at 67–83. The brief notes the following:
The pervasively religious nature of Providence and the resulting impact on
health care were amply developed by witness George Aighmey [sic].
[E]ighmey is an estates attorney, a former Oregon legislator who was
intimately involved in the passage of Oregon’s Death With Dignity Act, and is
presently Executive Director of Compassion in Dying. In that capacity he has
directly counseled or worked with many dying patients, some in Lincoln
County. Their capacity to obtain assistance will be seriously compromised
under the Operating Agreement, because of the Religious Directives, as
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confirmed by [E]ighmey’s direct experience in dealing with Providence. That
experience includes taking testimony as a legislator on the Judiciary
Committee, in which Providence opposed physician-assisted suicide;
administering an AIDS hospice owned by Providence, which limited contacts
between homosexuals; and meeting and discussing these issues with John Lee
and Father Tuohey, where they expressed the views reflected in the Religious
Directives. There will be an impact on services in Lincoln County.
Lois Backus, the Executive Director of Planned Parenthood, testified to the
same effect. As such she is responsible for developing and delivering
educational and clinical programs and services involving abortion,
sterilization, contraception and family planning. All of these would be
prohibited under the Operating Agreement, because of the Religious
Directives. The impact of this was dramatized by the simple testimony that the
most widely used method of contraception is tubal ligation, performed upon
many women after labor and delivery. All agree this is now available at the
Newport Hospital. It would not be available under the partnership with
Providence’s management.
Id. at 64.
313
Id. at 67. The brief notes the following:
The Agreement with Providence will affect present or potential health care
services at the beginning of life, such as assisted reproduction, tubal ligations,
vasectomies, and abortion. End of life health care will also be burdened or
precluded, particularly…advance Directives and physician assisted suicide
under Oregon’s Death With Dignity Act. . . . A similar fate awaits family
planning and contraception. All of this has been amply argued previously. . . .
Here, however, a different emphasis and context are presented. The [Health]
District by its Agreement with Providence is sharply curtailing its role as
health care provider. It has deliberately chosen a provider who will
inadequately assume the [Health] District’s responsibilities. [Health] District
residents will have to travel great distances or go without beginning of life and
end of life services. The [Health] District, through Providence, is burdening
residents’ interests in those services, interests which are constitutionally
protected . . . .
The three sources of entitlement here—substantive statutes, organic statutes
setting up the [Health] District, and the [Health] District’s own Bylaws—
create legitimate expectations in the citizens in the [Health] District. These
interests are protected under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution. The Due Process Clause
protects citizens of the [Health] District from the loss of liberty without Due
Process of law. Liberty may be procedural, protected by the right to a hearing,
or it may be “substantive”, that is, a form of “liberty” created by statutory
expectancy or entitlement under state law, as noted above. There is a third
form of “liberty” protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, and that consists of
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liberties created by the United States Constitution itself. These liberties are
endangered, unduly burdened, when government as here—arbitrarily abandons
its role and curtails service, entrusting its services to a hostile provider.
***
The merit of—and need for—the partnership Agreement with Providence bears
directly on its constitutionality. There are two grounds of Constitutional
invalidity: that the First Amendment[’s] and Article I’s bars on aid to religion
are violated, and that the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process protection of
liberty, including choice and autonomy in health care, is infringed. These
infringements can only be justified by governmental interests that are so
“compelling” that the infringements are not “undue burdens.” But the
Operating Agreement does not serve even minimally rational interests, let
alone compelling interests.
***
John Lee and Michael Fraser testified (as did Mark May) that the [Health]
District does not need to be “saved.” The [Health] District has consistently
operated “in the black” and—indeed—has built $8,000,000 in reserves over
the past two decades from operating income. At most, there is a danger of
financial risk faced over the next few years by small, rural hospitals. But
Father John Golenski testified that the 1994 Balanced Budget Act, which cut
back on hospital revenues, causing those economic difficulties, is under review
and revision. His present position requires reviewing such developments for a
consortium of health care and community agencies.
Id. at 67–68, 73–74.
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See Gallo, supra note 307.
315
See Counterclaims for Damages and Injunctive Relief at 8, 12, In re Gary Hoagland,
No. 00-1227 (Cir. Ct. Or. filed Mar. 16, 2000) (on file with the Seattle Journal for Social
Justice) [hereinafter Counterclaims for Damages].
316
Intervenor Providence Health System-Oregon’s Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject
Matter Jurisdiction, In re Gary Hoagland, No. 00-1227 (Cir. Ct. Or. filed Mar. 16, 2000)
(on file with the Seattle Journal for Social Justice).
317
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994).
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes
to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an
action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress, except that
in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in
such officer’s judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a
declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable. For the
purposes of this section, any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the
District of Columbia shall be considered to be a statute of the District of
Columbia.
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Id.; 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (1988).
In any action or proceeding to enforce [provisions in the vindication of civil
rights] . . . the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other
than the United States, a reasonable attorney’s fee as part of the costs, except
that in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken
in such officer’s judicial capacity such officer shall not be held liable for any
costs, including attorney’s fees, unless such action was clearly in excess of
such officer’s jurisdiction.
Id.
318
See id.
319
See, e.g., Hewitt v. Helms, 482 U.S. 755, 760–761 (1987); Kilgour v. City of
Pasadena, 53 F.3d 1007, 1010 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that even in the absence of a
favorable judgment, a litigant may be a “prevailing party” for purposes of an attorney fee
award if his or her action was a “catalyst” which motivated the opponents to change their
unlawful conduct); Citizens Against Tax Waste v. Westerville Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 985
F.2d 255 (6th Cir. 1993) (finding citizens who brought suit which caused the Board to
change its policy were a prevailing party entitled to attorney’s fees despite no final
judgment or decree in the citizens’ favor).
320
Stivers v. Pierce, 71 F.3d 732, 752 (1995).
321
Counterclaims for Damages, supra note 315, at 16.
322
Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep’t of Health & Human Res., 532
U.S. 598 (2001).
323
Id. at 605.
324
Having served as the attorney for the citizen litigators, the author would be remiss if
he did not acknowledge the courage and commitment of his witnesses and clients. A
number of witnesses have been noted above. Several had no stake in the case and came
forward at some personal risk, as was the case with Virginia Terhaar and Lois Backus.
Others, such as George Eighmey, Father Golinsky, and Merwyn Greenlich, with great
professional expertise, faced substantial logistical burdens in presenting their testimony.
From the Ad Hoc Committee itself, Hilda Moravick and Claudia Williams brought
expertise as professionals to their roles as witnesses. No case is better than its witnesses,
and we were blessed with excellent, public-spirited witnesses in Newport.
The clients are deserving of equal or higher praise. Many have been mentioned above
and their invaluable contributions duly noted. Particularly deserving mention are
Corrinne Williams, Norman Johnson, and Barbara Davidson, who served in leadership
roles, bearing much of the exposure generated by major controversy in a small
community. Carol Gundlach, herself a health care professional and consultant, made the
initial contact with the author, and provided valuable expertise and a sustaining
commitment, despite the demands of a practice and the pursuit of a graduate degree at
Oregon State University. Hospitality and housing for an itinerant barrister were provided
generously by committee members Pat Wold and Nel Ward—the latter in particular
offered the top floor of a bed-and-breakfast as a war room during the trial itself.
Civil liberties and community governance in a democracy are won and sustained only
by committed people, willing to take risks in the face of hazard. When Benjamin
Franklin, upon leaving the Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia, was asked whether
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we had a monarchy or a republic, he reportedly replied, “We have a republic, madam. If
we can keep it.” I am greatly indebted to the members of the Ad Hoc Committee (as are
the people of Newport) for their investment in our republic and their commitment to our
Constitution.
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See DIRECTIVES, supra note 7, at pt. VI, directives 68–71.
326
See Press Release, George W. Bush, Framework to Modernize and Improve Medicare
Fact Sheet (Mar. 4, 2003), http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/03/200303041.html (last visited Nov. 20, 2004).
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See Matthew 22:21.
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